


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Soviet Union

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 11, November 1987

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[The following is a translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated.]

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USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

History of U.S. Attitudes Toward Soviet State

18030003a Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 87 (signed to press 20 Oct 87) pp 3-10

[Article by B.R. Izakov: "Seventy Years"]

[Text] Seventy years ago an event in Russia marked the beginning of a new era in history. "Our revolution, the most outstanding event of the 20th century, heralded the start of a new era in the life of mankind,"¹ the CPSU Central Committee's Address to the Soviet People says. In a country exhausted by the imperialist war, the people, with the working class and its Bolshevik Party, Lenin's party, in the lead, rebelled against the supremacy of capitalists and landowners. Soviets of workers', soldiers', and peasants' deputies took charge of the government, and the Russian word "soviet" was first heard in all of the languages of our planet. The revolutionary program expressed the wishes and desires of the masses: peace for the tortured country, land for the peasants, and freedom from capitalist exploitation for the workers.

In an effort to hold on to their capital, land, and privileges, Russia's former masters started a civil war, a fight for death instead of for life. All of the forces of the old world rushed to their aid because they did not want to reconcile themselves to the birth of the new order and the worker and peasant state. Enemies in the imperialist war were united by their hatred for the Russian Soviets. After Germany was defeated, the winners' camp—France, England, the United States, Japan, and their allies—assumed the leadership of the anti-Soviet struggle. The phrase "crusade against Bolshevism" began to be used in statements by officials and in the press; this phrase has become a cliché and is still being repeated by the political parrots.

American ruling circles took an anti-Soviet stand. This was a result of their hatred for the worker and peasant state, which had nationalized the property of capitalists, both Russian and foreign, including Americans. There was the additional ingredient of fear: the fear that labor in America would follow the Russian example. Furthermore, there was already a growing conviction in Washington that the banks of the Potomac were the best place to see everything, to see what was good or bad for the United States and also for any other country. Since the time of President Theodore Roosevelt, this had been accompanied by faith in the "big stick" as an effective argument in settling international disagreements. The "big stick" was set in motion.

The Wilson administration began to interfere vigorously in Russian affairs. Secretary of State R. Lansing sent Ambassador D. Francis in Petrograd an urgent message prohibiting official relations with the Soviet Government and responses to this government's messages and

notes. "The President wants," Lansing wired on 6 December 1917, "American representatives to avoid direct contact with the Bolsheviks."² Four days later, on 10 December, Lansing submitted a lengthy report to the President on the events in Russia and proposed U.S. assistance in the establishment of a military dictatorship headed by tsarist General Kaledin.³

The American Embassy in Petrograd took an active part in fueling the intervention. Ambassador Francis, who had once been a banker, communicated only with representatives of the elite of the old Russian regime—financiers, industrialists, generals, and leaders of bourgeois parties. All of them were seething with hatred for the Soviet regime, dreaming up plots against it, and predicting its swift and unavoidable collapse. Dispatches containing reports of this kind were flown from the American Embassy to Washington (and, incidentally, from the embassies of other Western powers to the appropriate capitals). These reports, presenting a distorted account of events in Russia, served as reference points for government decisions. Decisions, however, cannot be any better than the information available to the people who make them.

The purely mercenary motives of prominent international businessmen whose property had been nationalized by the Soviets also played a role in fueling the anti-Soviet intervention. These were extremely influential people like American oil magnate H. Hoover, who had once effectively controlled all of the Maykop oil and would become the president of the United States in the near future. Hoover was the one who later told a SAN FRANCISCO NEWS correspondent: "Quite frankly, my life's ambition is to destroy Soviet Russia."⁴

When President Wilson arrived at the Paris peace conference in January 1919, he brought a program envisaging uncompromising struggle against Soviet Russia. The State Department prepared a map for the American delegation, depicting Russia without its Baltic territories, Belorussia, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, Siberia, and Central Asia, and leaving only the central Russian highlands untouched.⁵ Of course, there was the prediction that the Soviets would be destroyed everywhere and that their place would be taken by counterrevolutionary White Guard governments. This was not only a plan to eliminate all of the gains of October—it was a plan for the effective elimination of Russia as a great power.

By that time the armed intervention of the allied capitalist states was at its height.⁶ By 3 June 1918 the Allies' Supreme War Council had already decided to send an expeditionary force made up of American, English, French, and Italian units into northern Russia.⁷ They soon began landing in Murmansk.

The United States and Japan signed an agreement to send 10,000 soldiers each to the Russian Far East. The United States actually exceeded this quota, and as for Japan, it increased the number of its troops in the Far

East to 100,000.⁸ When Admiral Kolchak accomplished his counterrevolutionary coup in Omsk and began his operations in Siberia, he had a visit from an official American spokesman, the consul-general in Irkutsk, who promised him the support and assistance of the United States.⁹ The United States offered Kolchak millions in credit and began supplying him with weapons.

In southern Russia a U.S. military mission headed by Admiral McKelly was operating out of General Denikin's headquarters. McKelly served as Denikin's military adviser.¹⁰

The civil war in Russia, just as any civil war anywhere, was fierce and violent. The White Guard armies and interventionist groups flooded the country with blood, killing, ravaging, and pillaging. The Soviet people of the older generation saw this with their own eyes. The Americans who are our contemporaries can get some idea of the outrages committed by occupation forces from the notorious television mini-series "Amerika"—only in this case the outrages were committed not by Russian soldiers on American land but by Americans trampling on Russian land.

Not all Americans, however, joined this "crusade." It is with the deepest respect and gratitude that people in our country recall the Americans of that terrible time who courageously protested the interventionist policy of the "big stick" and defended the Soviet people's inalienable right to settle their own internal affairs and choose their own government.

In Congress this was done courageously and consistently by senators W. Borah and H. Johnson (both Republicans). In the Senate on 5 September 1919, for example, W. Borah declared: "Mr. Chairman, we are not at war with Russia; Congress has not declared war on the Russian government or the Russian people. The people of the United States do not want a war with Russia.... In spite of this, although we are not at war and although Congress has not declared war, we are conducting military operations against the Russian people. We are keeping an army in Russia; we are supplying other armed forces in this country with ammunition and food and we are taking part in the armed conflict as if Congress had given its approval, as if war had been declared, and as if the nation had been called to arms.... There is no legal or moral justification for the sacrifice of these lives. This violates the cardinal principles of a free state."¹¹

Even American personnel in Russia were not unanimous. Colonel R. Robins, a Republican and renowned public spokesman representing the American Red Cross in Russia, resolutely advocated the recognition of the Soviet Government and cooperation with it. At his own risk and peril, he practiced what he preached and had meetings with V.I. Lenin. Obviously, this could not and did not go on for long: The State Department recalled Robins to the United States, where he had to convince a

Senate committee that he was...not a Bolshevik. "Trying to surmount ideas with bayonets is a futile endeavor!"¹² he told the committee members in disgust.

Some American news correspondents were also courageous and fearlessly told the truth about the events in Russia. The main one was John Reed, the author of the famous book "Ten Days that Shook the World,"¹³ and his friend Albert Rhys Williams. In February 1919 renowned American writer Lincoln Steffens visited Russia and then pronounced the famous phrase that spread quickly to every part of the United States: "I have seen the future and it works."¹⁴

There were also businessmen like A. Hammer, who went against official policy by trying to organize commercial relations with the Nation of Soviets.

And of course, it is with warm feelings of fraternal gratitude that we recall the assistance our country received during the days of the revolution and the civil war from the laboring public in foreign countries, including workers in America. A mass movement of solidarity with the Russian revolution was launched throughout the world, and "Hands off Soviet Russia!" committees sprang up everywhere. The League of Friends of Soviet Russia, League of Support for the Recall of American Soldiers from Russia, and other such organizations sprang up in the United States. In Chicago the American Federation of Labor threatened a general strike in the event of continued intervention. Emotional rallies took place. Dockworkers refused to handle military equipment for the White Army and interventionist groups, and seamen refused to deliver it.

A document from the enemy camp provides eloquent proof of the difficulties the American workers created for the enemies of the Russian revolution. On 22 October 1919 Admiral Kolchak's representative in Washington reported to his patron in Omsk: "My greatest fear is that, in view of the recent increase in strikes and labor unrest here, there is no absolute guarantee that orders will be filled on time, in spite of all of the financial sacrifices. Recently dockworkers here followed the example set in other countries by refusing to load military supplies for us and crew members refused to go to sea on these ships. It is possible, therefore, that this movement could spread to the ammunition plants."¹⁵

On battlefields in Russia fierce skirmishes were being fought and the fate of the revolution was being decided—the very existence of the Soviet regime was in question. The young Red Army, the offspring of the revolution, was conquering the White Guard troops and the interventionist expeditionary forces. The hungry, poorly armed Red Army soldiers, some of whom had only bast sandals to wear, were gaining the upper hand over the well-fed, fully armed, and superbly equipped soldiers of the counterrevolution and foreign intervention. The commanders of the revolutionary forces, Frunze and Tukhachevskiy, Uborevich and Blyukher,

Chapayev and Shchors, who had learned the martial arts on the battlefield, were defeating tsarist generals from celebrated military academies as well as American, English, French, and Japanese generals. As V.I. Lenin said, "no one can defeat a nation in which the majority of workers and peasants realize, sense, and see that they are defending their own Soviet government—a government of the laboring public—and that they are defending a cause whose victory will guarantee them and their children the chance to make use of all the fruits of culture and products of human labor."¹⁶ The words which had been spoken within the American Senate were also corroborated: "Trying to surmount ideas with bayonets is a futile endeavor."

The illusion of the intervention's organizers which led to their scandalous failure was the false assumption in ruling circles in capitalist countries (an assumption that still exists today) that any revolutionary liberation movement is the result of an insidious plot. Getting rid of the plotters takes care of the entire matter. But a revolution is accomplished by people inspired by great ideas.

As for the policy of the "big stick," it is fundamentally flawed and does not even work every time. After all, the stick can be handled by another stick. Even in Machiavelli's time there was the old adage that "you can decide to start a war but you cannot decide its outcome."¹⁷

The big stick of the people's war drove the White Guard army and interventionist troops out of the Soviet land. The people began restoring their ravaged motherland.

The movement abroad for solidarity with the Soviet land entered a new phase. It took the form of fraternal assistance to combat the effects of the poor harvest in Russia, technical assistance in Soviet economic construction, and a steady stream of volunteers ready to take part in this construction. The laboring public in America occupied a prominent place in this movement.¹⁸

Our enemies, however, had not laid down their arms yet. Preparations were made for a new anti-Soviet "crusade." The first step was to give the Soviet country the face of a sworn enemy and portray it as the center of all evil. A campaign of unprecedented dimensions was launched to denigrate the USSR.

The campaign began immediately after October and was launched at the very highest level. At the Paris peace conference the Allied Powers' "experts" on the "Russian question" were already vying with one another in the concoction of outrageous lies. The French ambassador in Russia, J. Noulens, a close friend of his American colleague Francis, provided this description of the Bolshevik "atrocities": "They are drowning people, cutting off their tongues and noses, burying them alive, maiming them, staging public executions to intimidate people, raping and pillaging.... There is a company of professional executioners stationed at the Fortress of Peter and

Paul."¹⁹ If this kind of nonsense was being spouted by high-level officials at an official conference, it is easy to imagine what was being concocted by the capitalist press.

The political campaign to poison hearts and minds went on for seven decades, and it is still going on today, but its methods are more subtle and refined. The Bolsheviks are no longer being accused of "cutting off tongues and noses," but of constantly thinking up ways of attacking foreign countries, occupying them, and enslaving their people.

But reality had its say. As the entire world became convinced of the stability of the Soviet regime, it gained increasing official recognition. It was even recognized by the former participants in the intervention—England, France, Japan, and others. Businessmen followed diplomats to Moscow, or even preceded them, to establish commercial contacts. The wall of the political and economic blockade erected around Soviet Russia collapsed. Only Washington maintained its old stance and even made every effort to undermine these long-overdue processes by shamelessly exerting pressure on other capitals. These attempts turned out to be futile: By the middle of the 1920's the Soviet Union already had diplomatic relations with 22 states on different continents, including every great power but the United States.²⁰

Washington arrogantly stood alone. It constantly urged the capitalist world to repeat the anti-Soviet military venture. American Ambassador to France Gerrick's appeal for a new "crusade" against the USSR in 1927 caused a stir. His appeal had militaristic overtones because he made his speech in the Paris cemetery for the American soldiers who had fallen in the world war. There was every indication that the Washington administration was behind this speech.

When people in the United States realized that appeals for a new anti-Soviet military campaign were useless, they began to rely on the forces that seemed to be planning their own anti-Soviet ventures: the militarists in Germany and Japan.

With the encouragement of government circles, American banks and concerns offered huge credits to German industrialists. "They," a renowned German researcher wrote, "served as the basis to make German production so efficient and so modern that its capacities were increased to a truly exceptional degree."²¹ This is how the material base of German revanchism was created.

In the Pacific the Americans watched, seemingly as disinterested observers, as Japan armed itself and as the aggression of Japanese militarism grew and developed in China. They firmly believed that Japan's move toward Manchuria would lead sooner or later to a Japanese-Soviet war.

The reason for recalling all of this is not to reopen old wounds. The past must be remembered so that lessons can be learned for the future.

Washington continued adhering to its policy of the non-recognition of the Soviet Union, with all of the ensuing consequences, until the farsighted politician and realist F. Roosevelt entered the White House. It was obvious to him that this policy was counterproductive and ruinous.

As for Moscow, it was always prepared for peaceful coexistence and cooperation with all other countries, regardless of their social order. This was stressed several times by the great architect of the Russian revolution, V.I. Lenin.²² Why is it that even in the difficult years of open confrontation he said that "we are definitely in favor of economic agreements with America—with all countries, but *especially* with America"?²³ Probably because our two great countries were capable of supplementing one another in the economic sphere to their mutual benefit. Besides this, the most difficult problems could have been solved through concerted effort.

As soon as the White House decided to normalize relations with the Soviet Union, Moscow responded with equal willingness and mutual understanding.

When the author of this article was a correspondent in London in the early 1930's, he witnessed the start of Soviet-American diplomatic contacts. In June 1933 USSR People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinov and U.S. Secretary of State C. Hull arrived in the British capital for an international economic and financial conference as the heads of their respective delegations. There were contacts—as yet unofficial—between the Soviet and American delegations. Everyone was so accustomed then to Washington's uncompromising and irreconcilable policy toward Moscow that the mere presence of American diplomatic vehicles in Kensington Gardens in front of the Soviet Embassy caused a sensation and was reported in the newspapers. It was clear that the ice was beginning to melt.

Soon afterward, President F. Roosevelt exchanged letters with Chairman M.I. Kalinin of the USSR Central Executive Committee in October. In his letter Roosevelt expressed regret that the two great nations "with a strong tradition of friendship beneficial to both sides for over a century" had not maintained normal relations. The President proposed the start of negotiations.²⁴ In his response, M.I. Kalinin reported that the Soviet Government accepted the proposal and was sending M.M. Litvinov to the United States for that purpose.²⁵

The talks in Washington were concluded to mutual satisfaction. On 16 November 1933 diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and the United States. On that day President Roosevelt wrote: "I hope that the relations established between our nations today

will always remain normal and friendly and that our people will be able to cooperate in the future for their mutual benefit and for the preservation of peace throughout the world."²⁶

History confirmed the President's words just a few years later. At the decisive moment the USSR and the United States, allies in the antifascist coalition, repulsed the aggressors who had started World War II—Germany and Japan. The blood of Soviet and American soldiers was shed for a common cause.

During the final phase of the war the Soviet and American armies attacked Hitler's reich from the east and the west, advancing toward designated frontiers in a strategic cooperative operation. In the Berlin bunker in the last days before his death, Hitler had visions of discord between the allies. Just as the fuhrer's other dreams, this one was a meaningless fantasy. The meeting of the Soviet and American fighting units on the Elbe was the anti-Hitler alliance's shining hour. At midnight on 8 May 1945, in Karlshorst, a Berlin neighborhood, Germany signed an unconditional surrender in the presence of representatives of the armed forces of the USSR, the United States, England, and France.²⁷

Allied armed forces then smashed the Japanese aggressors in the Far East and forced them to surrender.

Since that time much has been done in the West to erase the memory of the military alliance and joint struggle of the 1940's from people's minds. We would like to believe that the lasting symbol of World War II retained in American minds will not be the cemetery in Bittburg with its rows of SS graves, but the solitary grave of the American soldier who asked to be buried on the site of the historic meeting on the Elbe.

Even before the last volleys of the war had been fired and President Roosevelt had been laid to rest, forces driven by an unquenchable hatred for the Soviet land and for socialism were back at the helm in the United States. Washington began its "cold war" against the USSR. Even during the military operations in the Far East, the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were intended less to break Japan, which was already in the throes of death, than to intimidate Moscow. The possession of the atom bomb made many people in Washington dizzy with success: It seemed to them that nothing could ever stand in the way of American world supremacy again.

Was there an alternative to the "cold war"? Yes, there was.

In fall 1946 my work as a journalist took me to America, where the "Wallace Affair" was then big news. Wallace, the last of Roosevelt's closest advisers and friends, had retained his departmental position in the Truman Administration and was fighting resolutely against the "cold war." He was not afraid to bring the secret battles

into the open. At a mass rally in New York he said: "We must have the bases of a genuine peace with Russia, a peace which cannot be wrecked by extremist propaganda.... There will always be an ideological conflict, but this is no reason for diplomats to stop laying the foundation for the safe existence of the two systems side by side.... We must not allow our policy toward the Soviet Union to be guided or influenced by those inside and outside the United States (a reference to W. Churchill—B.I.) who want war with the Soviet Union." As a result of all this, Truman asked for Wallace's resignation, and the last advocate of Roosevelt's policies left the administration.

We can only guess what might have happened to Soviet-American relations and to the rest of the world if Wallace's views had prevailed in Washington after the war. In the America of those days, however, this was unthinkable because anti-Soviet forces were still dictating their will.

This was followed by the years of "cold war" and of the arms race connected with it. Published archival documents and memoirs of statesmen testify that if the USSR had not developed its own weapon, equal to the American one, Washington would not have confined itself to atomic blackmail. "Dropshot"—a plan conceived by the Pentagon, approved by the White House, and envisaging nuclear strikes against all of the important centers of the Soviet Union, provides sufficient proof of this. But the United States did not gain anything from this arms race: Although it has been proved that the USSR did not initiate a single round of the spiralling arms race, it always found the appropriate response to nullify all efforts to make the United States militarily superior to the Soviet Union.

The tension in Soviet-American relations has lasted for decades, mounting and waning, but always casting a gloomy shadow on the state of world affairs. Sometimes the gloom was lifted when the Soviet Union and sensible groups in other countries, including the United States, were able to take steps to strengthen the peace.

The current Soviet leadership has made a truly heroic effort to break out of the vicious circle in which Soviet-American relations and all international relations have been trapped. "The CPSU believes that the policies of the two powers should be geared to mutual understanding, and not to enmity, which could have a catastrophic effect on the Soviet and American people and on all other people,"²⁸ M.S. Gorbachev said at the 27th party congress.

These words were followed by concrete actions, bold initiatives, and far-reaching proposals, which are vivid in the reader's memory.

These efforts are beginning to bear fruit. As we know, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. Shevardnadze's talks with U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz in Washington in September led to a fundamental agreement on the elimination of two categories of nuclear weapons—medium-range and operational-tactical missiles. As the saying goes, the first step is the hardest. In his article "Reality and Guarantees of a Safe World," M.S. Gorbachev writes: "The treaty on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles would be an excellent prelude to the negotiation of substantial—50-percent—reductions in **strategic offensive arms under the conditions of the strict observance of the ABM Treaty.**"²⁹

A fresh breeze has penetrated the previously stagnant international atmosphere and is making its way to all parts of the planet. The new image of socialism in the land of Soviets is arousing increasing sympathy abroad and is promoting mutual understanding.

The history of Soviet-American relations in the last 70 years teaches us that confrontation between our two powers is not a fatal inevitability and that cooperation and even mutual effort in our common interest are possible, in spite of the tenacity of the capitalist groups in U.S. ruling spheres that reacted with hostility to the Russian October revolution and despise the socialist system. It also teaches us that America is not a unified and monolithic anti-Soviet camp; even within its ruling spheres, and at the most difficult times, there are always forces objecting to the policy of confrontation and willing to coexist in friendship with the other social system. Past experience gives us reason to believe that these forces will make their wishes known today. Events daily confirm their accuracy. The future belongs to them.

Footnotes

1. PRAVDA, 14 March 1987.
2. "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter called FRUS). 1918. Russia," Wash., 1931-1932, vol 1, p 289.
3. "FRUS. The Lansing Papers," vol 2, pp 343-345.
4. Quoted in: M. Sayers and A. Kahn, "The Secret War Against Soviet Russia" (tr. fr. Engl.), Moscow, 1947, pp 395-396.
5. "Istoriya diplomatii" [Diplomatic History], vol III, Moscow, 1965, p 139.
6. See the article by A.S. Yakushevskiy in this issue of the journal.
7. "Istoriya diplomatii," vol III, p 125.
8. Ibid., p 128.
9. Ibid., p 179.

10. Ibid., p 180.
11. Quoted in: M. Sayers and A. Kahn, Op. cit., pp 93-94.
12. Ibid., pp 33-34.
13. B. A. Gilenson, "He Witnessed the Birth of a New World," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1987, No 10.
14. Quoted in: M. Sayers and A. Kahn, Op. cit., p 83.
15. "Istoriya diplomatii," vol III, pp 186-187.
16. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 38, p 315.
17. N. Machiavelli, "The History of Florence," Lenin-grad, 1973, p 107.
18. See the article by P.S. Petrov in this issue of the journal.
19. Quoted in: M. Sayers and A. Kahn, Op. cit., p 78.
20. "Istoriya diplomatii," vol III, pp 403-404.
21. A. Norden, "The Lessons of German History. An Inquiry into the Political Role of Financial Capital and the Junkers," tr. fr. Germ., Moscow, 1948, p 75.
22. See the article by E. Henry in this issue of the journal.
23. V.I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 39, p 209.
24. "Istoriya diplomatii," vol III, pp 597-598.
25. Ibid., p 598.
26. Ibid.
27. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945 gg." [The History of World War II, 1939-1945], vol 10, Moscow, 1979, p 364.
28. "Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1986, p 177.
29. PRAVDA, 17 September 1987.

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Course of U.S.-USSR Economic Relations Examined

18030003b Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 87 (signed to press 20 Oct 87) pp 40-49

[Article by V.B. Spandaryan: "Soviet-American Economic Relations: Past, Present, and Future"]

[Text] The founder of the world's first socialist state, V.I. Lenin, attached special importance to the establishment of Soviet-American relations, including economic relations. "We are definitely in favor of economic agreements with America—with all countries, but *especially* with America."¹ Vladimir Ilyich said this back in 1919!

Reality confirmed the accuracy of Lenin's words about the possibility and expediency of the peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation of states with different socioeconomic systems, including the USSR and the United States. The realization of this fact did not come easily in the United States, however, because of the fierce struggle between two trends: the tendency to develop economic contacts with the USSR and the efforts to limit and curtail them.

It is significant that the negative policies of various American administrations have never won universal or unconditional support in the United States. There have always been politicians, public spokesmen, businessmen, and scientists who, guided by good sense and the real interests of their country, have advocated mutually beneficial contacts with the Soviet Union. It was this, combined with the Soviet State's consistently constructive policy line, that kept the possibility of the revival and expansion of Soviet-American economic relations alive even during the most difficult periods.

I

One of the main elements of the principle of peaceful coexistence as V.I. Lenin formulated it, the development of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations, was officially proclaimed the permanent basis of the Soviet republic's foreign policy line in 1920 in a statement by the Government of the RSFSR. "Our motto," it said, "has always been the same: Peaceful coexistence with all other governments without exception. Reality itself has faced us and other states with the need to establish long-term relationships between the government of workers and peasants and the capitalist governments. These long-term relationships are dictated by economic reality. Economic reality demands the exchange of goods and the establishment of permanent and regulated relationships with the entire world, and the same economic reality demands the same of other governments."²

Under the specific historical conditions of that time, V.I. Lenin proposed the joint exploitation and use of Russian natural resources and the use of the huge Russian market for sales of American and European manufactured goods.

Soviet Russia's constructive approach was categorically rejected by the U.S. administration of that time. Its policy toward the world's first socialist state was one of unconcealed hostility. This policy was reflected in the economic blockade and the financial boycott of Soviet Russia, which were intended to smother its national economy after it had been ravaged by wars, intervention, and chaos. As early as 24 November 1917 the U.S. Government decided not to send foodstuffs and other goods to Russia "as long as the status of this country is in doubt and as long as the Bolsheviks remain in power and advance their peace plan."³ This decision was a harbinger of the economic blockade of the Soviet republic. The Entente countries followed the U.S. example by prohibiting the export of goods to Soviet Russia, and under pressure from them the Scandinavian states reduced their trade with our country dramatically.

To break through the blockade and establish normal trade relations, the RSFSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs appointed L.K. Martens its representative to the United States at the beginning of 1919. The representative of the RSFSR had an office in New York. The U.S. business community displayed considerable interest in the establishment of trade and economic relations with the Soviet republic, but the U.S. administration impeded the development of Soviet-American business contacts. What is more, the office was raided and L.K. Martens was deported. The State Department issued a directive "not to make any deals with the Moscow regime,"⁴ and a short time later Secretary of State C. Hughes informed the young republic that the establishment of trade relations would be conditional upon "fundamental changes in the Soviet socialist order."⁵

In fall 1919 the Entente Supreme Council, with the vigorous support of the U.S. Government, announced an economic blockade of Soviet Russia.

It was not until after the main counterrevolutionary and interventionist forces had been defeated in our country that the U.S. Government officially "declined" to participate in the blockade of the Soviet republic. At this time, however, it established a financial boycott by prohibiting the purchase of gold "of Bolshevik origin" and the extension of credit.⁶ At that time the American Government's moves were tantamount to the continuation of the commercial blockade policy.

Although many capitalist countries began developing trade relations with our country in 1920 after the Entente had to lift the economic blockade of Soviet Russia, the United States stubbornly adhered to the line of the economic ostracism of the Soviet State.

The failure of the blockade, Soviet Russia's establishment of trade relations with a number of states, and the persistent demands of part of the American business community forced the U.S. administration to allow trade with our country in 1922 without giving it legal recognition. Even after this, the normal progression of Soviet-American economic relations was repeatedly impeded in Washington. Nevertheless, there was some development in these relations in the 1920's and 1930's to the obvious advantage of both sides. This included the offer of concessions to American firms for the exploitation of some crude resources in our country, the large deliveries of Ford tractors to the USSR, the organization of credit and financial cooperation with several American banks, and the agreement on scientific and technical cooperation with more than 40 large American companies (General Electric, Ford Motors, Du Pont de Nemours, and others). Many American firms and specialists took an active part in such major construction projects of the prewar five-year plans as Dneproges, the Magnitogorsk and Novokuznetsk metallurgical combines, the tractor plants in Stalingrad and Kharkov, and the motor vehicle plant in Gorkiy. By 1931 the Soviet Union was the largest importer of American equipment. The USSR's substantial purchases of U.S. goods between 1929 and 1933 helped many American firms survive this difficult period and secured the employment of hundreds of thousands of American workers at a time of severe unemployment.

Nevertheless, it took the severe upheavals of the world economic crisis, the recognition of the lethal danger of German fascism and Japanese militarism, and, last but not least, the political wisdom of President F. Roosevelt before the United States finally recognized the USSR in 1933, more than a decade and a half after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, concluded its first trade agreement with the USSR in 1935, and then offered it most-favored-nation status by the terms of a 1937 agreement.

Therefore, before World War II legal treaties had laid the foundation for the normal development of Soviet-American trade and created the necessary conditions for the growth of this trade. In 1937 and 1938 the United States took the lead among all of our trade partners in exports to the USSR. In 1940 the USSR made almost one-third of its overseas purchases in the American market. American firms assisted in the construction of Zaporozhstal, in remodeling the Moscow-Khabarovsk telegraph network, etc.

During the war years the military, political, and economic cooperation of the two countries made a substantial contribution to the victory over our common enemy. Lend-lease shipments from the United States played a definite role in solving several military and economic problems, although they could not compare to the Soviet Union's huge material expenditures on the war against fascism. The experience accumulated in these transactions by Soviet organizations and American firms could

have been put to use in peacetime. According to the calculations of American business groups, commodity turnover between the USSR and the United States could have reached 5 billion dollars a year in the 2 or 3 years after the war—i.e., the Soviet Union could have accounted for 25-30 percent of all U.S. foreign trade during that period. This, however, did not happen.

The U.S. administration resumed its efforts to undermine and curtail economic relations with the Soviet Union. Once again there was the expectation that our country had suffered such tremendous losses that it would be unable to restore its national economy without help. The prevailing opinion in Washington was that "Russia's economic recovery would have been impossible without the help of the United States" and that the Soviet Union should be prepared to "pay any political price we charge."⁷

The trade war against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries was an integral part of the "cold war." Within just a few years the entire edifice of Soviet-American economic relations was essentially destroyed and a system of all-encompassing restrictions was erected in its place: There were stringent export controls and the lists of the so-called "strategic goods" which could not be exported to the USSR and other socialist states; trade agreements with them were broken unilaterally, the most-favored-nation status was cancelled, and imports of goods from the countries of the socialist camp were subject to discriminatory restrictions. This was accompanied by concerted pressure on the dependent states. They were threatened with the cessation of shipments of American goods and financial aid for the failure to adhere to the U.S. line. This policy of pressure and threats was illustrated best in the notorious "Battle Act" (the 1951 law on the control of aid for the purpose of mutual defense) and the creation of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control (CoCom).

None of these measures produced the main results, however: They could not halt the economic recovery of the USSR and the countries of popular democracy or stop the reinforcement of their economic, scientific, and technical potential. The United States' only indisputable achievement was the dramatic reduction of trade and other forms of economic, scientific, and technical cooperation with the USSR and the loss of many large Soviet orders for machines, equipment, industrial materials, and consumer goods by many American firms. American importers lost the chance to acquire several traditional and new Soviet export goods.

II

The all-encompassing system of discriminatory bans and restrictions on trade with the USSR, a system erected by the U.S. administration during the first postwar years, began to crack under the strain of political and economic changes in the world.

As a result of the consistently peaceful policy of the Soviet Union, the "cold war" ice started to thaw in the early 1970's and the relaxation of international tension began. This was accompanied by a strong movement in the U.S. business and political communities for the review of policy toward the USSR, including the approach to Soviet-American trade. Changes in the overall moral-political and psychological climate in the country contributed to this. The military-industrial complex and the foreign policy serving its limited purposes were the targets of intensive criticism. Other important factors were the exacerbation of domestic socioeconomic problems and the United States' gradual loss of its leading position in the world capitalist economy, international trade and finance, scientific and technical progress, etc.

Productive summit-level talks led to the conclusion of fundamentally important agreements in the political and military spheres and laid the basis for the normalization of bilateral trade and economic relations.

A **trade agreement** envisaging the mutual granting of most-favored-nation status, the renunciation of all types of discrimination in trade relations, and the commitment of the sides to encourage the establishment of effective business contacts between commercial organizations and firms in the two countries, with consideration for the resources of each country and its long-range needs for raw materials, equipment, and technology, was signed in October 1972. The office of a USSR trade representative in Washington and a U.S. commercial bureau in Moscow were opened. The two sides resolved to triple the commodity turnover of the 1969-1971 period within the next 3 years.

An agreement was reached on the settlement of lend-lease charges. An **agreement on the mutual extension of credits** and an **agreement on financing procedure**, in accordance with which the American side extended the general rules of export credit to the USSR, were signed at that same time. On a reciprocal basis, American firms could ask for Soviet credits when they purchased equipment from the USSR.

A short time later, in 1974, a long-term **agreement on the promotion of economic, industrial, and technical cooperation** between the USSR and the United States was concluded and created new opportunities for a variety of long-term relationships between the two countries and for joint construction projects in third countries.

The group of agreements listed above helped to create favorable conditions for the consistent development of bilateral economic relations. Total commodity turnover between 1971 and 1975 exceeded 5.4 billion dollars—i.e., eight times the turnover of the previous five-year plan. Soviet organizations concluded several sweeping agreements on trade and economic cooperation with Occidental Petroleum, Pepsico, Armco Steel, IBM, Ingersoll-Rand, and other American corporations.⁸ The

joint Soviet-American Trade Commission, established in 1972, and the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council (ASTEC), established a year later, began operating successfully.

The revival of Soviet-American economic contacts was short-lived, however, and the mechanism of their development soon hit the skids. No action was ever taken on the most important agreements. Once again, the narrow group interests of the most reactionary and anti-Soviet forces in the United States prevailed. Issues having no connection with economic relations were used as excuses for obstruction, and demands were made that represented direct intervention in the internal affairs of the USSR. Later the events in Afghanistan and Poland were used as a pretext for the resurrection of the policy of discrimination and prohibitions.

It must be said that one of the main underlying motives for the more negative approach to economic contacts with the USSR was the revival of the hope that their curtailment would undermine Soviet economic and military strength. The need to compound the difficulties and stagnation of the Soviet economy was underscored. As General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev stressed in his speech at the 18th Congress of Trade Unions of the USSR, "the concerted attack—economic, political, psychological, and militaristic—launched at the turn of the decade by reactionary forces was dictated by, among other things, the state of our internal affairs."⁹ The deceleration of economic growth, the serious shortcomings in the work of several leading branches of industry and agriculture, the lopsided structure of Soviet foreign trade, and the excessive dependence on exports of energy resources and huge imports of grain—all of this gave birth to futile hopes, reinforced by the "authoritative" studies of some Western economists and CIA reports, for the swift collapse of the Soviet economy and its stronger dependence on deliveries of important commodities and advanced technology from the United States and other Western countries.

It was precisely on the basis of these expectations that President J. Carter instituted an embargo on grain sales and the stricter control of exports of the latest technology to the Soviet Union in 1980. At the end of 1981 Ronald Reagan imposed a ban on exports of oil and gas prospecting and drilling equipment to the USSR from the United States and then extended the ban half a year later to the equipment of branches of American companies abroad and even of independent foreign companies producing this kind of equipment on American licenses. Concerted pressure was simultaneously exerted on the West European countries and Japan to undermine the Siberia-Western Europe pipeline project.

The results of the "sanctions" are known to everyone. The grain embargo injured the interests of American agriculture and American farmers perceptibly and

undermined the United States' reputation in the international marketplace. Reagan had to lift Carter's embargo, but shipments of American grain to the Soviet market were reduced considerably by the USSR's decision to seek other, more reliable suppliers. In 1982 the West European governments rejected Reagan's "extra-territorial embargo" as an act contrary to international law and instructed firms to honor the contracts they had signed as part of the "gas for pipes" agreement. The pipeline was completed on schedule. And if this action had a damaging effect, it was U.S. relations with allies and American business that were hurt instead of the Soviet Union. The Reagan Administration eventually had to lift its bans.

The stricter control of exports of commodities and new technology to the USSR in the second half of the 1970's and in the 1980's hurt the interests of several large companies in leading sectors of the American economy. Here are just a few examples. The Control Data corporation lost an order for a computer intended for meteorological research (the Soviet Union installed one of its own computers instead), and Sperry Rand lost an order for a computer for TASS. Dresser Industries lost an opportunity to supply the machine tools for a plant producing drilling equipment (the Soviet Union built the plant itself). Another corporation, Otis Engineering, lost a substantial contract for the delivery of air lift equipment for the secondary recovery of oil (it was signed with a French firm instead). Armco Steel lost a large order for a complete set of equipment for the production of transformer sheet (the contract was awarded to a French firm).

Another result of the American prohibitions that was the direct opposite of what the advocates of "economic warfare" had expected was the accelerated development and mastery of the production of specific types of equipment, machinery, and technology by Soviet enterprises, which led to the complete loss of the market for these products.

In the opinion of J. Kaiser, president of the Kaiser Research firm, the policy of restrictions and bans on exports of the latest technology to the USSR is based on ignorance with regard to the actual level of Soviet scientific and technical development and on obsolete ideas about the underdevelopment of the Soviet Union. He illustrates his conclusion with the following example. After World War II the United States prohibited exports of industrial diamonds to the USSR. This led to the successful development of their mining in Siberia and to the establishment of synthetic diamond production in the Soviet Union. As a result, diamonds became a major Soviet export item.

A group of prominent American businessmen and scientists published a book of collected articles with the extremely interesting title "Common Sense in U.S.-Soviet Trade."¹⁰ The combination of the pragmatic approach of renowned businessmen and the analytical

thinking of prominent scientists produced a cogent description of the present state and developmental prospects of Soviet-American economic relations and a devastating assessment of the performance of the U.S. administration in this area. The book is full of phrases such as "ineffective policy," "counterproductive behavior," "mistaken policy line," etc.

The logical conclusion, in the opinion of R. Schmidt, vice president of Control Data and chairman of the American Committee for East-West Accord, is the following: "The time has come to take an unemotional look at our trade with the USSR, with the aid of the best information and a conscientious attempt to correct past mistakes."¹¹

At the beginning of 1987 the U.S. National Academy of Sciences published a study asserting that existing restrictions on exports, especially the so-called "dual-purpose" commodities (those which can be used for civilian and for military purposes), were not producing the anticipated result—they were not causing the USSR to lag behind the United States in the sphere of advanced technology. At the same time, as a result of these restrictions, the United States was annually losing export orders for a total sum of around 9 billion dollars, which was equivalent to the loss of 200,000 jobs.¹²

The Commission on Industrial Competitiveness, headed by President Young of the Hewlett-Packard corporation, also demanded the review of export legislation.¹³

III

In our day the attitudes of broad segments of the American public toward economic contacts with the USSR have been influenced by sweeping changes in the U.S. economy and in the national economy of the Soviet Union as well as by the obvious ineffectiveness of the policy of embargoes and trade discrimination.

People in the United States have recently invested a great deal of hope in exports of American products and in the enhancement of their competitive potential, particularly in connection with the abrupt decline of the dollar exchange rate, as methods of maintaining economic growth and reducing the huge deficit in the balance of trade and the foreign debt. According to a Department of Commerce forecast, for example, the proportion accounted for by U.S. exports in the GNP will be double the 1986 figure in 2011 and will reach 21 percent!

Under these conditions, it would be improvident at the very least to ignore the large Soviet market with its tremendous potential, particularly in view of the fact that the United States' West European and Japanese competitors are gaining perceptible advantages from the development of economic contacts with the USSR and are reaching agreements with the Soviet side on their further and considerable expansion on a long-term basis.

Radical changes are also taking place in our country: The revolutionary restructuring of the economy, including the reform of foreign economic operations, is creating new opportunities for the development of trade, economic, scientific, and technical cooperation with foreign states and for more productive and diversified participation by the USSR in international division of labor.

All of this has not escaped the attention of the American public, which has displayed a growing interest in the reforms in the Soviet Union.

There are some signs of a shift in emphasis in Washington from the question of whether it is necessary to trade with the USSR to the question of how this trade with our country should be conducted.

The 10th annual meeting of ASTEC and the 9th session of the joint Soviet-American Trade Commission in June 1986 demonstrated the growing interest of American business groups and the U.S. administration in the possibility of broader commercial contacts with the Soviet Union.

The head of the Soviet delegation, USSR Minister of Foreign Trade B.I. Aristov, was received by President R. Reagan and had conversations with members of the U.S. administration (Secretary of State G. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury J. Baker, Secretary of Agriculture R. Lyng, and others). All of them spoke in favor of broader mutual trade, but still with reservations and in relation to matters having no direct connection with trade. Nevertheless, the commission sessions, especially the statements by U.S. Secretary of Commerce M. Baldrige, revealed the American side's interest in the development of trade with the USSR and an increase in trade volume within the framework of current U.S. legislation and the intention to seek solutions to problems inhibiting this. The American side reported, in particular, its decision to continue its efforts to lift the embargo on imports of seven types of Soviet furs and the ban on shipments of Soviet nickel to the United States.

The head of the Soviet delegation called for a new approach to trade relations, saying that the main thing was the desire to conduct affairs on the basis of equality and mutual advantage and an unconditional understanding of the fact that any kind of discrimination violates normal economic contacts between countries and leads to their curtailment.

An agreement was reached at the session to make a more vigorous effort to plan and promote projects of mutual interest, particularly in such fields as the food industry, the production of construction equipment, the concentration of iron ore, the construction of coal lines, the production of irrigation equipment, and the chemical industry.

The American officials attending the ASTEC meeting displayed considerable interest in new forms of commercial cooperation with Soviet organizations (joint cooperative production, the exchange of licenses on a compensatory basis, and the establishment of joint enterprises). The Soviet side reported on the legal aspects of the improvement of Soviet foreign economic contacts, including the procedure for the establishment of joint enterprises.

During the Soviet-American talks which took place when U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz visited Moscow in April 1987, the prospects for trade and economic cooperation were among the topics of discussion. Both sides noted that the necessary objective preconditions for the development of this cooperation exist. Above all, these include the tremendous economic and intellectual potential of both countries and the vast dimensions of their domestic markets.

It is a fact that the USSR and the United States account for around 45 percent of world industrial production and over 17 percent of world trade and occupy a leading position in many areas of scientific and technical progress. Therefore, there is great potential for the development of Soviet-American economic cooperation. Today, however, it does not amount to much. The United States accounts for only 1.3 percent of the foreign trade of the USSR, and the Soviet Union accounts for even less in U.S. foreign trade. Furthermore, the absolute volume of Soviet-American trade has displayed a tendency toward reduction in recent years.

USSR Trade with United States, billions of rubles

| Categories | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 |
|------------|--------|--------|--------|
| Exports | 305.9 | 326.1 | 312.5 |
| Imports | 2829.0 | 2377.0 | 1146.0 |
| Turnover | 3134.9 | 2703.1 | 1458.5 |

Source: "Vneshnyaya trgovlya SSSR v 1985 g. Statisticheskiy sbornik" [USSR Foreign Trade in 1985. Collected Statistics], Moscow, 1986, p. 14; VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA, 1987, No 3 (Appendix).

These figures reflect primarily the decrease in Soviet purchases of U.S. grain. As for other items, discriminatory restrictions are preventing the export of modern American equipment, machinery, and technology to the USSR and are erecting prohibitive barriers to block the expansion of Soviet industrial exports to the United States.

This naturally raises questions about the prospects for the restoration and development of Soviet-American economic relations. Is there any real possibility of this, and what will all of this require?

IV

The entire history of Soviet-American economic relations proves that their development definitely depends on the state of political relations, which, as Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.I. Ryzhkov remarked in a conversation with G. Shultz on 14 April 1987, are now burdened by the American side's confrontational approach and its attempts to gain unilateral advantages.¹⁴

This means that the establishment of a favorable political atmosphere for the development of Soviet-American economic cooperation will depend primarily on U.S. ruling circles, because the Soviet Union has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to meet the other side halfway.

Above all, it will be necessary to radically revise the long-established American mental stereotypes in this area, namely to reject the false idea that the development of economic relations between the two countries is supposedly of greater benefit and importance to the USSR, which is supposedly the only one to gain advantages from these relations at the expense of U.S. interests. It was this idea that lay at the basis of the attempts to block trade with our country completely and of the so-called "policy of linking" economic issues with political demands on the USSR.

The first concrete move should be the restoration of the foundation laid in the first half of the 1970's and consisting of trade agreements. This mechanism, which was operating well but was then shut down by the American side, could be set in motion quickly when necessary.

It is obvious that economic relations cannot be fully developed without the mutual granting of most-favored-nation status and normal credit opportunities or without the unconditional observance of the terms of intergovernmental agreements and commercial contracts. This is why the American administration's elimination of artificial obstacles and discriminatory restrictions is of primary significance. This will require a new way of thinking, particularly the renunciation of the broad and arbitrary interpretation of the term "strategic goods," which introduces ambiguity and unpredictable elements into commercial relations.

It is also obvious that the establishment of normal conditions for the development of Soviet-American economic relations will secure only favorable **opportunities** for their considerable expansion. The **realization** of these opportunities, however, will require effort on both sides.

There must be a more vigorous effort to establish and expand reciprocal business relations and contacts. Because of anti-Soviet propaganda and the stringent limits on trade with the USSR, many American firms know nothing about the capabilities and needs of the

Soviet market and have no idea of how to do business with Soviet organizations. In turn, Soviet organizations which have had little or no access to the American market for many years often prefer to deal with firms in other industrially developed states.

To develop mutual trade, both countries will have to enhance the competitive potential of their goods. This is a matter of equal urgency to the United States and the Soviet Union and for the same reasons in both countries. The combined effort and advantages of the two sides could produce a significant impact in this respect, especially in the development and incorporation of advanced technology, in the organization of industrial cooperation, and in the operation of joint enterprises.

Considerable opportunities also exist for the organization of cooperation with American firms in the exploitation of natural resources in the Soviet Far East and in the northern regions of both countries, and for the development of the Pacific economy as a whole.

Trade between the two countries cannot develop successfully on a chronically imbalanced basis, and this makes the expansion of Soviet exports, particularly of manufactured items, to the United States a matter of primary significance.

The reorganization of foreign economic activity in the USSR, especially the direct entry of foreign markets by many industrial ministries, associations, and enterprises, and the possibility of establishing joint Soviet-American companies should heighten the efficiency and flexibility of Soviet foreign trade organizations, enhance their competitive potential in international trade, and accelerate the resolution of many problems in trade, economic, scientific, and technical cooperation.

In addition to the great bilateral significance of Soviet-American economic relations, they have another aspect, which could be termed international. In our day they cannot develop in isolation from international economic relations. Today U.S. policy toward the USSR is having a negative effect on the development of all world economic relations, because the United States is demanding that other capitalist states and many developing countries institute similar restrictions and bans and is impeding our country's participation in international economic organizations, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Consequently, the normalization and development of bilateral economic relations between the USSR and the United States would obviously promote the more balanced and constructive development of the world economy and of international trade in general, solve several global problems, and establish equal economic security for all states.

The conclusion of radical arms control agreements could do much to develop Soviet-American economic relations because it would make sizable quantities of material,

financial, and human resources available for the development of civilian sectors of the economy and thereby contribute to the growth of mutual trade. The normalization and development of Soviet-American economic relations is also connected directly with the most vital issue of the present day—the need to consolidate the peace.

"In this dangerous world," M.S. Gorbachev said when he addressed the 9th annual ASTEC meeting, "we simply do not have the option or the right to disregard such important means of stabilizing relations as trade, economic, scientific, and technical contacts. If we really want strong and stable relations, capable of securing a reliable peace, the development of business relations must be part of their foundation."¹⁵

All of the experience in Soviet-American economic contacts testifies conclusively to the benefits of a realistic and constructive approach to this important matter on both sides. It is important not only from the standpoint of Soviet-American cooperation, but also in the stabilization of the international economic and political situation.

Footnotes

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7. A. Carr, "Truman, Stalin and Peace," Doubleday, New York, 1950, pp 25-26.
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13. THE ECONOMIST, 6-12 December 1986, p 32.
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U.S.-USSR Dialogue: Difficulties, Prospects
18030003c Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 87 (signed to press 20 Oct 87) pp 50-59

[Article by R.G. Bogdanov]

[Text] At the end of this century, politicians, scientists, literary scholars and, in general, the thinking public will certainly take time to review and summarize the results of the last hundred years. What will they regard as the most important sign of our times? What will they see as the central issues requiring thorough study and analysis for the good of the citizens of the 21st century? It is most probable that they will see them in the group of changes giving birth to the new way of political thinking in every area of social development, especially in the military and foreign policy sphere. And it is probable that they will see the measure of success or failure as something directly related to the ability of ruling circles of that time to adapt quickly to these changes, bring all existing structures in line with them, get rid of obsolete ideas and even beliefs, and incorporate the new way of political thinking in everyday life.

Soviet-American relations will be examined precisely from this vantage point. And although the title of this article optimistically contains the word "dialogue," as if it were a fait accompli and as if it had replaced confrontation, this optimism is justified only on the condition that the new way of political thinking gain the upper hand in Soviet-American relations, in the spheres of military and foreign policy, and thereby pave the way for the triumph of new approaches and non-traditional decisions.

If the new way of political thinking is regarded as an instrument for understanding the realities of today's world, the basis of this thinking consists of objective and accurate assessments, consideration for common human values, and a definite emphasis on the survival of the human race and the progress of our societies in the nuclear-space age. The weapons capable of paralyzing the vital nerves of the planet can be neutralized and then discarded only with the aid of sensible policy, presupposing the refusal to continue heaping up mountains of

new weapons to keep the strategy of mutual deterrence afloat, a strategy which has led all of us into impenetrable nuclear jungles and blind alleys.

The fundamental problem in Soviet-American relations was stated unequivocally by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev when he spoke with outstanding Colombian writer Gabriel Garcia Marquez: "Is it possible that we are not smart enough to reach a mutual understanding not to blow up the world just because of our differences?"¹

By the dictates of history, around 96 percent of all nuclear potential is concentrated in U.S. and Soviet strategic weapons. The Soviet Union was forced by circumstances to create its own nuclear shield. The policy of atomic blackmail which was conducted against our country in the difficult postwar years by U.S. ruling circles and the interests of the Soviet State's survival and of its retention of an independent policy not only demanded the elimination of the American monopoly on nuclear weapons but also put an end to the invulnerability of targets in North America. The parity in strategic arms the Soviet side later achieved considerably limited the ability of U.S. ruling circles to employ the military solution in the historic dispute with socialism. Strategic parity, in spite of its flaws, will continue to have a stabilizing effect in the near future. It is probable that parity will be necessary as long as nuclear weapons exist.

The White House has not given up its reliance on force and is still trying to teach others how to conduct their own affairs. These are precisely the elements of American policy that are pernicious and counterproductive, but they are an important component of the hegemonic ideology permeating the practice of U.S. foreign policy. This policy ignores a new reality of our time: The nuclear threat has made all of us equals—those who are willing to use the lethal weapons, those who refuse to use them first, and those who do not have these weapons and do not plan to ever have them.

Let us return now to the beginning of the 1980's. The world situation was extremely alarming. The unprecedented arms race was being continued in the United States. Washington was escalating it by announcing its "Star Wars" plans. American medium-range missiles designed for a first strike began to be deployed in Western Europe. Conservative political forces controlled the government in several of the largest capitalist countries, and the military-industrial complex and its apologists for nuclear warfare were gaining stronger influence. They were growing more aggressive. Undeclared wars were started against the people of Afghanistan and Nicaragua. Interventionist forces bearing different flags were committing outrages in Lebanon. After the conservatives took charge of the White House they tried to get rid of the "Vietnam syndrome" by launching a shameful aggressive campaign against the independence of tiny Grenada and by staging a piratical attack on Libya.

By the middle of the 1980's the politico-military tension had been escalated to the critical point. It seemed to some people that the world's slide into the abyss had become irreversible. The possibility of global catastrophe today, right now, was sensed and acknowledged. More than ever before, it seemed close, real, and possible at any instant. The leaders of "the six" tried to sound the alarm: "Each day we stay alive seems to be a gift. It is as if all humanity is on death row, awaiting a sudden and unannounced execution."²

It was at this dramatic time that Lenin's party took vigorous steps after the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum to create the necessary conditions for a healthier international atmosphere. Its initiatives were new and bold and were quite surprising to many. They offered a life-giving breath of fresh air to a world suffocating in the atmosphere of extreme tension. The current of fresh air grew stronger after the publication of M.S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986. The sequential program for the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000 indicated a realistic way of preventing catastrophe and filled people with the hope of a safe world.

This will depend to a considerable extent on the state of Soviet-American relations.

"Our generation of politicians inherited the job of correcting the situation before it is too late," M.S. Gorbachev stressed in a conversation with a delegation from the American Council on Foreign Relations. "The Soviet Union will make a maximum effort to be equal to the position it was assigned by history."³ In this context, it will be important to keep the channels of Soviet-American dialogue open at all times, as a way of learning the positions of the two sides, of finding mutually acceptable compromises and, finally, of maintaining a sense of contact.

The development and maintenance of Soviet-American dialogue have never been a simple and smooth process. Some American administrations have preferred unilateral authoritarianism, with the notorious nuclear deterrents playing the main role, to dialogue on the basis of equality. On the American side dialogue was usually regarded as an anomaly or a necessary concession to the USSR. Because of the realization that military-strategic parity also meant the loss of the invulnerability of American territory, dialogue with us was always accompanied by U.S. attempts to achieve unilateral military superiority.

The American strategic triad is already capable of delivering over 12,000 nuclear warheads with a force of from 50 kilotons to 10 megatons each to the territory of the USSR. Nevertheless, U.S. military and political leaders plan to augment the fighting capabilities of land- and sea-based missile forces and of strategic aviation from 1.5-fold to 2.5-fold by 1990. The SALT II treaty has been discarded. For more than a year and a half the

Soviet Union adhered to a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests, but the United States did not join the Soviet Union and even continued its tests. This forced the USSR to cancel its moratorium. Now the Pentagon is making speedy preparations for the gradual deployment of a broad-scale ABM system as part of the SDI program and is deliberately breaking the Soviet-American ABM Treaty—an important braking mechanism in the arms race. The efforts of some American circles to put weapons in space as quickly as possible are intended to make the SDI program irrevocable and to essentially exclude the possibility of limiting or stopping the arms race. With the aid of this system, they hope to reduce the Soviet potential for retaliation, make the United States invulnerable in a nuclear war, and secure the possibility of delivering a first strike with impunity.

By stepping up the work on this program, some people across the ocean hope to use the arms race to cause insoluble problems and economic difficulties for the Soviet Union. They are basing these hopes on past experience, remembering how the Soviet side usually had symmetrical responses in the arms race the United States had started and played by the American "rules of the game." In the presence of "defensive strategy" and "military sufficiency," based on forces sufficient to repulse possible aggression but insufficient for offensive operations, these American hopes will become illusions.

The fleeting nuclear age has made its own laws. Reducing time limits to the minimum, it will require the maximum mobilization of human intelligence and will to prevent the start of an all-annihilating holocaust, to improve the international atmosphere, and to lay the foundation for common and equal security.

When Ronald Reagan took office, he issued a public appeal for confrontation with the USSR, for a "crusade" against the "evil empire." The continuing state of military-strategic parity, however, is frustrating the plans of the "war party." At the same time, as a genuine deterrent, parity has made it possible to give up old ideological stereotypes and has underscored the priority of peace over all other values.

All of the Soviet side's initiatory proposals have been discussed thoroughly on the governmental level and, of course, from the military standpoint. Possible changes in the military-strategic situation and the potential of the USSR and its allies are carefully considered. This kind of discussion and, of course, common sense define the limits of our unilateral moves and compromise proposals. In this sense, we make concessions but we do not concede.

Our new policy, which has emerged from the state of stagnation that did not signify, as events demonstrated, genuine firmness, confused the most aggressive members of the U.S. ruling class, who began to feel like a fish out of water on the field of confrontation and forceful antagonism. This had been a familiar field, where the

game had been played according to their rules for decades. Now the Soviet side is converting Soviet-American relations into a contest of peaceful proposals—proposals which are realistic and therefore difficult to reject. On this field militarism has proved to be insolvent and impotent and has demonstrated a lack of creative imagination and dynamism. It has been in the position of a fish deprived of its natural habitat and therefore writhing in convulsions. The sight of this is doing much to discredit militarist forces in the eyes of the world public.

The 27th CPSU Congress stressed that the time had come to give up the forms and stereotypes of political thinking that had taken shape in the pre-nuclear age. As the political report of the CPSU Central Committee to the congress said, "today's world is too small and too fragile for wars and power politics. It cannot be saved and preserved without the renunciation—resolute and irrevocable—of the way of thinking and behaving that was based for centuries on the acceptability and permissibility of wars and armed conflicts."⁴

By the time of the summit meeting in Geneva (November 1985), the President of the United States was already agreeing that there can be no winners in a nuclear war. This was essentially an admission that the socialist order cannot be conquered by the forces of war today. The capitalist order, by the same token, is also invincible to outside military force.⁵ If we consider how difficult the journey to Geneva was, we can call it a success. But this was only the first step. It is clear that each subsequent step will require even more effort, more willingness to listen, and more desire and ability to understand one another and meet one another halfway. And the main thing will be the willingness to master the difficult art of reaching agreements on an equal and mutually acceptable basis, without which no one can ever solve the serious problems in Soviet-American relations.

This excludes the possibility of struggle between the two systems in the form of wars. The 27th CPSU Congress formulated the fundamentally important conclusion that the objective conditions have been established for struggle between capitalism and socialism in the international arena **solely** and **exclusively** in the forms of peaceful competition and peaceful rivalry.

Under present conditions no country is capable of defending itself reliably with military-technical means alone. The nature of modern weapons and the existence of parity tell us that political means are becoming the only way of guaranteeing security. The 27th congress proceeded from a belief in the principles of equality, mutuality, and the observance of the interests of all sides, and this was reflected in the fundamentals formulated at the congress for a comprehensive system of international security, encompassing all major spheres of communication by states—military, political, economic, and humanitarian. The most important condition of the

new type of behavior in the world arena presupposes the demilitarization of political thinking. The combination of the new way of thinking and new forms of action represents one of the main principles of previously unparalleled behavior in the world arena.

The Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva was followed by another great event—the new meeting of this kind in Reykjavik in October 1986. It fit logically into the framework of U.S.-USSR dialogue, but on a qualitatively new level: The principles of common security were becoming part of the way of thinking. This was the first time the two great powers had come so close to reaching an agreement on radical nuclear arms reduction. The SDI kept the agreement from being concluded. Nevertheless, the situation changed radically after Reykjavik. Everyone could see that disarmament was possible and that the two sides could agree. This was the essence of the changes following Reykjavik. The Americans came to the meeting unprepared and were the victims of their own propaganda. They assumed that M.S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986 was not that serious. A careful examination of the Soviet proposals of that time reveals that they contain almost everything proposed in Reykjavik. The meeting confirmed that the statement of 15 January was not a utopian slogan, not "just a wonderful dream," as some people in the West were calling it, but a concrete plan which could be set in motion without delay.

To conceal the importance of the agreements reached in Reykjavik, the irritating myth of the "Soviet military threat" is being resurrected in the United States. The opponents of nuclear disarmament are saying that the USSR is trying to eliminate nuclear weapons solely for the purpose of securing its own superiority in conventional arms. Last June, however, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies proposed comprehensive and substantial reductions in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe—from the Atlantic to the Urals. In addition, one element of the Soviet disarmament plan proposed in the statement of 15 January is the complete elimination of chemical weapons, one of the most dangerous and barbarous types of weapons of mass destruction, by the end of the century.

The new way of political thinking, on which the statement was based, is encountering many obstacles. Nevertheless, it is already affecting behavior. For example, the Soviet Union's constructive interaction with other participants in the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and on Security and Disarmament in Europe contributed to its successful conclusion. Our country has earnestly proposed that the results of the Stockholm conference be developed in Vienna at the next meeting of representatives of the states party to the all-Europe conference.

The nuclear disarmament proposals had a special impact because they were advanced by a strong and great power capable of solving any scientific or technical problem.

The Soviet Union's material and intellectual potential secures its ability to develop any kind of weapon. The USSR does not want to be more secure than any other state but will not settle for being less secure.

This is precisely what the meeting in the capital of Iceland revealed: Agreement is possible when the countries are guided by the principle of common security—i.e., when they acknowledge that their own security cannot be stronger than the security of the potential adversary and that this adversary must have the same degree of security as themselves. On this basis strategic arms agreements can be concluded. On this basis agreements were reached in Stockholm. On this basis the sides almost agreed on the elimination of medium-range and operational-tactical missiles.

In the past it was assumed that if a country was strong it would be secure, and if a country grew even stronger it would be even more secure—if not alone, then with the aid of allies. Maximum security would be achieved when the enemy would be utterly defeated. We know what happened when the other side shared this assumption. The American side's behavior in Reykjavik was a cogent illustration of the use of obsolete dogma in modern politics: When one side begins striving for superiority (in this case, striving to take action on the SDI plans), even agreements based on the principle of common security are wrecked. The SDI proves that the desire for superiority could mean the end of the world.

Reykjavik corroborated the indisputable need to strengthen common security. The meeting in Iceland was one sign of the new way of thinking because it was probably the first time in history that people began thinking about the security of the potential adversary. In the age of "mutual assured destruction" there is only one kind of security—mutual. In relation to Reykjavik, this means that whatever was accomplished there must be preserved and protected so that it can continue to play its role in Soviet-American relations and in relations between human beings in general. The Soviet side, pursuing a policy presupposing moves in this direction and a search for solutions in the spirit of Reykjavik, advanced the bold proposal that the issue of medium-range missiles be discussed separately from the whole Reykjavik "package."

This gave Soviet-American dialogue new momentum. Later, however, the talks in Geneva were mired in the American side's far-fetched arguments and technocratic approach. Once again, the Soviet side displayed intelligent initiative by transcending the barriers that some are incapable of surmounting because of their stagnant political thinking. The Soviet Union again invited the U.S. administration to continue the search for solutions with a view to the results of the Reykjavik meeting.

The Moscow international forum "For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity" played an important role in the Soviet decision. It showed that consideration for world public opinion was one of the elements of

the new way of thinking. "When the public, politicians, and scientists asked us to take the medium-range missiles out of the Reykjavik 'package,'" M.S. Gorbachev said, "we responded by taking action and made this very move. What is more, we also agreed to eliminate operational-tactical missiles in Europe."⁶ It is also important that we do not regard our guiding principles as something invariable and immutable. They are constantly clarified in accordance with the specific situation.

On the basis of the spirit of Geneva and Reykjavik, the highly responsible approach of the Soviet side, and its flexibility, a fundamental agreement was reached in the middle of September on a treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles. The United States and the USSR also agreed on the need for more vigorous efforts to draft a treaty on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms within the framework of the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons. The sides agreed to begin a full-scale series of talks before December 1987 on nuclear tests. An agreement was signed on the establishment of centers for the reduction of nuclear danger.

These were the first tangible results of the perestroika in the foreign policy sphere. These are our assets. Many difficulties and many contradictions still exist, however, in Soviet-American relations. There is no alternative to peaceful coexistence. One of the chief aims of Soviet-American dialogue is the development of relations between the USSR and the United States in many fields, including economics, science, culture, and interpersonal contacts. Political interaction will serve these purposes well. The authors of the report of an influential American social organization, the Committee for National Security, published at the beginning of January 1987, made an accurate observation: "The United States and the Soviet Union have reached an important crossroads. One road leads to the complete subversion of arms control and the unprecedented escalation of the lethal nuclear rivalry. The other leads to the reinforcement of existing treaties and the conclusion of agreements on the substantial and stabilizing reduction of nuclear stockpiles on both sides. The key to these agreements consists in the limitation of SDI laboratory research in response to the reduction of strategic arsenals and the continued strict observance of the ABM Treaty. Reagan's interpretation of the ABM Treaty is inconsistent with the spirit and letter of this agreement. It will prevent the conclusion of agreements with the USSR on permissible SDI research."

The issue of security is the central topic of Soviet-American dialogue—equivalent security for each, all-encompassing in its parameters. Security is the state of trust between countries resulting from specific moves to give them the absolute certainty that they will not be the targets of the use of force or threats of force. In contrast to the United States and other NATO countries, the Soviet Union is willing to build its defense without relying on nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass

destruction. We are willing to begin reorganizing our entire military mechanism on nuclear-free principles without delay, as long as other nuclear powers do the same.

The Soviet side believes that nuclear disarmament should be accompanied by substantial reductions of armed forces and conventional arms on a mutual basis. The USSR has unilaterally pledged not to use nuclear weapons first. This decision is an immutable law of the life and operations of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is reflected in staff and troop training practices and in the willingness to institute stronger control to exclude the possibility of the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union unilaterally suspended nuclear tests and the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe, removed some of them from active duty, suspended the work on antisatellite weapons, etc.

A document on the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact countries was approved at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in Berlin in 1987. Its defensive nature is expressed clearly in the refusal to use nuclear weapons first or to start military operations in general, and in the introduction of the principle of reasonable sufficiency in military construction. This military doctrine is not aimed at winning wars, but at preventing them. It stipulates the need for Soviet military personnel to maintain the country's defensive capabilities at a level excluding the possibility of the military-strategic superiority of the other side or, by the same token, of their own side. Therefore, the Soviet side is introducing constructive elements into the Soviet-American dialogue, laying the foundation for significant advances and the improvement of relations between the United States and the USSR.

The main obstacles erected by the American side are connected precisely with the issue of security. The U.S. position on this matter is seriously impeding the development of dialogue; there is the impression that Washington is bearing down on the "brakes." It is as if the White House is stuck in a militaristic rut. This is all the more dangerous in view of the United States' colossal destructive potential and apparent lack of a constructive approach to the issues of disarmament and security.

In spite of the statements of some American officials about a commitment to nuclear disarmament, the military strategy of the United States, its military planning, the structure of its armed forces, and the regulation manuals of different branches of the armed services are still based on the use of nuclear weapons. And just recently we have been hearing that the armed forces of the United States and NATO are not prepared to perform their functions without nuclear weapons—not now and not even in the distant future. This is the reason for the arguments in favor of the improvement of nuclear weapons, the development of new types and models, and

the continuation of nuclear tests. Heightened competition is also being initiated in the fields of military chemistry and weapons based on new physical principles—a qualitative advance in so-called "conventional" arms.

How should we interpret this stance? Obviously, as evidence of either the mistaken belief that the USSR needs a normal politico-military climate more than the Western countries do, or the illusion that a little more effort will finally give the United States the military superiority it has been seeking and allow it to dictate its demands to the Soviet Union from a position of strength. Some people are still spinning fantasies about final military triumphs.

The Soviet side is certain that disarmament agreements are possible. This certainty is confirmed by practice. It would be wrong, however, to destroy past accomplishments. We must work, without any postponements or delays, on the entire group of problems, meet one another halfway, and display a willingness to make compromises. No one will be able to force anything on the other side. And the idea that the USSR has a greater interest than the United States in the improvement of Soviet-American relations must be discarded.

Our age is an age in which each country and each people, the smallest as well as the biggest, sees its independence as its most valuable possession and will go to any lengths to defend it. Nevertheless, we are still witnessing the increasing interdependence of states. This is an objective result of contemporary world development and an important factor of international stability. We welcome this interdependence. It could provide a strong incentive for the construction of stable, normal, and even friendly relations.

Learning to live in peace—and this is precisely the prevailing interest—is not simply a matter of refraining from war. A full life is different from vegetation in a state of fear of the mounting danger of war because it presupposes the development of contacts and cooperation on various levels, including trade.

The idea that the defensive potential of the USSR is almost wholly based on purchased Western technology and cannot be developed without it is absolute nonsense. The proponents of this view have simply forgotten which country they are referring to, have forgotten or want others to forget that the Soviet Union is a country of great scientific achievements and advanced technology, a country of outstanding scientists and engineers and highly skilled workers.

Of course, like any other country, we rely on world achievements in science and technology and on world production experience as well as on our own in civilian and in military production. This is a reality and an inevitability, and the United States itself provides an example of this. It is no secret that, for example, the

decisive role in the development of nuclear weapons and missiles there was played by European, including Russian and Soviet, and not American, science and scientists.

Neither today's realities nor the lessons of history can be forgotten. After all, it is a fact, for example, that the theoretical bases of rocket technology were discovered and developed by the outstanding Russian scientist K.E. Tsiolkovskiy, that it was in our country that the basis was laid for the concept of multistage rockets and the first experimental rockets were built, and, finally, that it was our country that launched the first artificial satellite. We will not even mention the first manned space flight.

We could say much about the contribution of Russian and Soviet scientists to the development of modern chemistry, but we will simply recall that half of the transuranium elements discovered between 1950 and the present day were discovered by Soviet scientists. It is also an indisputable fact that Soviet scientists made a tremendous contribution, the decisive contribution in many respects, to the development of the theory of chain reactions, the development of light and radiowave theory, and the discovery of lasers. Modern aerodynamics, ultralow temperatures, extremely high pressure, and almost all of the modern types of technology in metallurgy would be unimaginable without the contribution of Soviet scientists.

And we never say that American corporations are using technology stolen from the USSR!

All of the people living through the extraordinary events of our time have a legitimate sense of dissatisfaction with the rate of progress in international relations and in the sphere of Soviet-American contacts. The Soviet side does not try to impose its own philosophy of life on anyone and does not portray it as the highest truth. It is always receptive to constructive ideas and is encouraging all social forces, including Western ruling circles, to join in the search for solutions to the problems of our contradictory but interconnected world and to join in the collective development of a new way of thinking.

History tells us that each of the major social revolutions has been preceded by a revolution in social thinking. What will the conversion of the nuclear world into a non-nuclear one entail? Above all, the entire structure of international relations will require radical reorganization. Will this not represent a radical revolution of colossal dimensions and colossal influence in human life? It is genuinely comparable to the great revolutionary changes of the past. This conversion is being attempted within the framework of intricately interwoven conflicting tendencies, but it is gradually making some headway. The people who once shed crocodile tears over the "stilted" and "dull" foreign policy of the USSR are now realizing that it represents a powerful factor in the consolidation of peace.

It is of supreme significance that the incorporation of the new way of thinking and new policy in international relations is already an irrepressible process. Several facts attest to this. The main one is the reorientation of human thinking on the global level and the firm establishment of the idea of a nuclear-free world in the human mind. We can say without exaggeration that the UN General Assembly's approval of the idea of a comprehensive system of international security, encompassing all of its spheres—military, political, economic, and humanitarian—proposed by the group of socialist countries, was an important step in the reinforcement of the UN regulations with regard to peace, the framework within which the world community interacts. This created the framework for extensive and constructive dialogue regarding the essence of the new philosophy of security in the nuclear-space age and practical ways of reorganizing international relations on this basis. The support of the idea of common security by so many states testifies that the new way of thinking and action by governments and the tendency toward the democratization of international relations are constantly growing stronger.

The foreign policy of the USSR is an extension of its domestic policy; there is a vital connection between foreign policy practices and the processes occurring within our country. Therefore, the interests of the individual, humanitarian values, are assigned priority in these practices. The Soviet Union wants the pressing problems of humanity to be solved in humanitarian ways, on a truly humanitarian basis. To this end, it has proposed that a conference be convened in Moscow within the framework of the all-Europe process for the development of humanitarian cooperation and is willing to discuss all aspects of the issue of human rights and basic human freedoms on a serious and solid basis. The Soviet Union firmly believes that the individual's right to life, to work, and to equality before the law must be secured, supports the efforts of the United Nations and progressive international organizations to end racial and all other forms of discrimination, to stop the excessive enrichment of some as a result of the impoverishment of others, and to establish a more just and civilized world, and favors decisive action to eliminate the repulsive practice of international terrorism, which is taking the lives of innocent people and poisoning relations between nations.

At the conclusion of his meeting with the delegation from the American Council on Foreign Relations, M.S. Gorbachev made the following appeal: "However difficult it might be, let us meet one another halfway on the basis of an objective analysis of events and good sense."⁷

This would seem to be the only acceptable basis for productive Soviet-American dialogue.

But this is only the beginning of the journey. The road ahead is a long and difficult one. Action must be taken to dismantle the obstacles consisting of U.S. hegemonic ambitions, reinforced by an arms race aimed at military

superiority. We can only restrain these dangerous ambitions, but the renunciation of hegemonism will have to be done by the United States itself. The matter was stated correctly in the influential American journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS: "Can the United States as a society conduct a reasonable and consistent military and foreign policy?" This was followed by the equally accurate observation, as if in response to this question, that the convulsive reactions characteristic of U.S. policy in the last 40 years not only "cost too much but also created a colossal risk for humanity in the nuclear age."⁸ In addition, of course, the United States still has to prove its ability to demonstrate a better, universally acceptable way of life to the world. This is the meaning of the journal's concluding remarks.

In a world of nuclear-space realities the abandonment of a state's efforts to impose its own hegemony for the protection of its own "vital interests" is the way of achieving normal coexistence. Of course, this means that the renunciation of hegemony by one side must not lead to the hegemony of the other. The USSR is willing to conduct a dialogue and negotiate with the United States not as an inescapable and ruthless enemy, but as a potential partner. As M.S. Gorbachev remarked in one of his articles, "dangers putting the very immortality of the human race in question have arisen. This is why new rules of communal existence are needed."⁹

Footnotes

1. PRAVDA, 16 July 1987.
2. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, 1987, No 3, p 3.
3. PRAVDA, 5 February 1987.
4. "Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1986, p 65.
5. At the beginning of the 1980's the most prominent members of the Reagan Administration, including the President himself, were expressing the opinion that it was possible to win a nuclear war. Then in October 1981 Ronald Reagan aroused universal indignation in Europe by publicly referring to the possibility of "limited nuclear war" in the European theater (J. Wyllie, "European Security in the Nuclear Age," New York, 1986, pp 14-15).
6. PRAVDA, 24 June 1987.
7. Ibid., 5 February 1987.
8. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring 1987, p 850.
9. PRAVDA, 17 September 1987.

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Review of Books Tracing History of U.S. Expansionism

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[Review by I.G. Usachev of books "Ekspansionizm SShA na rubezhe XIX-XX vv. (Sovetskaya istoriografiya). Nauchno-analiticheskiy obzor" [U.S. Expansionism at the Turn of the Century (Soviet Historiography). Scientific-Analytical Survey] by I.N. Kravchenko, Moscow, 1986; "Burzhuaizmskiye politicheskiye partii SShA i amerikanskaya vneshnyaya politika (XIX-XX vv.). Sbornik obzorov" [Bourgeois Political Parties in the United States and American Foreign Policy (19th and 20th Centuries). Collected Surveys], Moscow, 1986; "Istoriya vneshney politiki i diplomatii SShA (1776-1917 gg.). Zarubezhnaya istoriografiya. Referativnyy sbornik" [The History of U.S. Foreign Policy and Diplomacy (1776-1917). Foreign Historiography. Collected Summaries], No 1, Moscow, 1986: "Roots of U.S. Expansionism"]

[Text] Recent years have been marked by significant advances in Soviet studies of American affairs: New books include such basic works as the four-volume "Istoriya SShA" [History of the United States], covering the period up to 1980, the two-volume "Sovremennaya vneshnyaya politika SShA" [Contemporary U.S. Foreign Policy], and several other works on various aspects of American imperialism's foreign policy. The foundation which has been laid obligates researchers to engage in deeper analysis and to reorient their work to some extent in line with the objectives set by the 27th CPSU Congress.

in an article entitled "The Achievement of a Qualitatively New Status for Soviet Society and the Social Sciences," Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and member of the Politburo A.N. Yakovlev stresses: "We must work out a comprehensive system of views and the kind of political philosophy that will allow the state to rise above existing conflicts when the survival of humanity is at stake.

"The creation of a demilitarized, nuclear-free world will necessitate the elimination of the deep-seated causes and roots of mistrust, tension, and hostility in today's world. Researchers of international affairs must decide how the traditional confrontational approaches in international relations can be surmounted."¹

There is hardly any need to prove that this applies primarily to researchers of American affairs—the political scientists, historians, sociologists, and economists studying the entire range of issues pertaining to U.S.

foreign policy. On the other side of the line dividing the two socioeconomic systems, it is precisely this state that calls the shots and has the greatest influence on the political climate in the world. "The imperious ambitions and mercenary policies of U.S. monopolies and their willingness, based on egotistical considerations, to sacrifice the interests and security of other states, even allies, are arousing increasing indignation and anxiety in the world,"² the CPSU Program (new edition) says.

It is a well-known fact that the nature of the policy of any state depends primarily on the class in power in this country. It is also a well-known fact that the deepest roots of a state's domestic and foreign policies are ultimately to be found in the economic interests of the dominant classes. The expansionism that is so characteristic of the contemporary United States did not come into being today or yesterday. Its genesis spans a lengthy period of history. The study of this process in line with the objectives set for researchers of international affairs by the party is acquiring special significance. After all, this is not so much a matter of the better comprehension and assessment of the past as an urgent need to thoroughly comprehend the main trends in American capitalism's foreign policy and diplomacy, trace their development, and recognize their contradictions.

The scientific-informational works published recently by the Institute of Scientific Information on the Social Sciences (INION) of the USSR Academy of Sciences cannot be ignored in this context. The latest works by Soviet researchers are analyzed in the scientific survey "Ekspansionizm SShA na rubezhe XIX-XX vv. (Sovetskaya istoriografiya)."

The author of this survey, Candidate of Historical Sciences I.N. Kravchenko, examined around 100 books, basing his study on the sound premise that there is an urgent need to categorize the many works on American expansionism published in our country in recent decades. It is true that this need does exist, in view of the great interest in U.S. politics among the researchers of academic institutions and VUZ's and the general public.

The chronological framework of the survey covers the period from 1870 to 1917—from Reconstruction to the U.S. involvement in World War I. The chronology of this study is different from that of the second volume of "Istoriya SShA" (covering the period from 1877 to 1918), and this should be avoided in future studies because the subject in both cases is the transition of capitalism from free competition to monopolies and the transition to the stage of imperialism. It would be best to adhere to a standard framework, as this would enhance the value of scientific surveys as supplements to basic works on the history of the United States.

In the first section of the survey, on the history of studies of American expansionism, the author discusses the achievements of Soviet scholars of American affairs in the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's at length and notes the

rapid development of this branch of historical science in the USSR. There is no question that these are important achievements, but it is still impossible to ignore the obvious gaps. For example, Soviet studies of American affairs have dealt with U.S. expansionism in the Far East and in Latin America in the greatest detail (p 11), but there is a regrettable lack of research dealing specifically with the general topic of U.S. expansionism at the turn of the century. Obviously, it is not ignored in the previously mentioned "Istoriya SShA," but there seems to be a need for a scientific work based on solid references and describing and analyzing all of the interacting causes and trends in the development of Washington's expansionist policy.

The sound observation that there are "virtually no studies" of relations between the United States and Russia at the turn of the century (p 15) also provides food for thought. The reference to G.P. Kuropyatnik's work, "Rossiya i SShA: ekonomicheskkiye, kulturnyye i diplomacheskkiye svyazi, 1867-1881" [Russia and the United States: Economic, Cultural, and Diplomatic Relations, 1867-1881], shows how the relations between the two countries could have been mutually enriching in the presence of goodwill in ruling circles and willingness to interact. This is worth considering. The ability to think with a view to mutual interests and an understanding of the unity of mankind is one element of the new way of political thinking.

The origins of American imperialism have always been a matter of great interest to Soviet researchers. The study of the United States' entry into the era of imperialism, begun in the two-volume "Ocherki novoy i noveyshey istorii SShA" [Essays on Modern and Contemporary U.S. History], published in 1960, is continued on a qualitatively new level in the second volume of "Istoriya SShA."

The analysis of books published between 1980 and 1985 will be of interest to the reader. The author assigns a prominent place to A.A. Gromyko's work "Vneshnyaya ekspansiya kapitala: istoriya i sovremennost" [The Foreign Expansion of Capital: Past and Present], where the direct connection between the imperialist ambitions of the American bourgeoisie in the economic sphere and its foreign policy is examined. "Uoll-strit i vneshnyaya politika" [Wall Street and Foreign Policy], a work by R.S. Ovinnikov, provides an understanding of the real extent to which Washington's foreign policy is influenced by the financial oligarchy. The author's examination of the role of various foundations established by the "vanguard of the specialized political, including foreign policy, echelon of the American financial oligarchy" is of special interest (pp 51-52).

Analyzing the evolution of U.S. expansionism, the author singles out the factor of oil. Soviet researchers have noted that the desire of American monopolies to control sources of oil is still one of the mainsprings of

American expansionism. It is impossible to ignore the particularly dangerous nature of U.S. aggressive policy in the Persian Gulf, where an explosive situation exists.

The actions of the Reagan Administration point up the relevance of Yu.M. Melnikov's work "Imperskaya politika SShA: istoki i sovremennost'" [U.S. Imperious Policy: Past and Present], revealing the historical roots and traditions of the foreign policy and ideology of American imperialism. They date back to the days when America was a slave-holding state, to the militaristic and jingoistic appeals of apologists for the strategy of power politics. The desire to conquer foreign lands, which was born at that time, was then supplemented at the turn of the century by the hope of creating an "invisible" American empire through the spread of U.S. economic, political, and military influence. This is how American imperialism's policy line of world domination took shape.

The disclosure of the ideological basis of expansionism and the exposure of all types of stereotypes and myths are among the most important duties of Soviet researchers today. The very concept of the new way of political thinking presupposes a struggle for the minds of people, the liberation of these minds from the fog of propaganda created in the West for decades, and the promotion of an understanding of the real values of today's world.

One of the obstacles impeding the new way of political thinking is the long-characteristic desire of U.S. ruling circles to retain their country's privileged status in the world. It took the form of claims for "extra security," accompanied by maneuvers to broaden the sphere of American influence and efforts to seize military bases and support points in foreign countries. The public was told that the state of the world was more or less acceptable to the United States as long as it fit in with the policy line of building up combat readiness in the interests of American hegemony (pp 75-76).

Although military strength is assigned obvious priority in the American foreign policy arsenal, Washington also uses other, non-military means. The genesis and evolution of these means—economic aggression, foreign trade blockades, financial blackmail, "psychological" warfare, and others—are examined by I.L. Sheydina in the work "Nevoyennyye faktory sily vo vneshney politike SShA" [Non-Military Factors of Force in U.S. Foreign Policy]. Even a brief glance at recent events provides convincing proof that the military factor of American foreign policy is devalued when the strategic parity of the two world systems restricts the freedom of American imperialism and it begins to place emphasis on non-military means. For this reason, it seems important to take up the baton of research in this field I.L. Sheydina was bearing before her untimely demise and to continue her efforts in this area.³

It would also be interesting to take a closer look at such relevant issues of our day as the non-equivalent exchanges and even outright theft the imperialists have forced others to accept and the brutal exploitation of partners and people overseas by American businessmen.

In the concluding part of the survey, I.N. Kravchenko sums up the conclusions of Soviet researchers. We will not repeat them here. The reader can learn about them himself by reading the survey. We will only underscore a single aspect which seems to us to be extremely important today—the divergence of interests within the American bourgeoisie and the existence of groups and circles preferring peaceful and mutually beneficial transactions to an aggressive and militaristic policy line (p 93).

The retrospective publications of the INION of the USSR Academy of Sciences, collected surveys and collected papers, provide considerable opportunities for the analysis of the state of scientific thinking, including foreign thinking. One of the works of interest in this context is "**Burzhuaiznyye politicheskiye partii SShA i amerikanskaya vneshnyaya politika (XIX-XX vv.)**," a collection of surveys compiled jointly by researchers of American affairs from the INION and Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov. Its contents are organically related to the survey discussed above. In American politics, as several dozen works by American authors testify, the most important role is played by the two leading bourgeois parties, which have a decisive impact on the formation and realization of the foreign policy aims of the ruling class. They also secure the necessary sociopolitical climate for the pursuit of Washington's foreign policy. The Democratic and Republican parties have also contributed much to the formation of the foreign policy establishment of the U.S. Government.

The anthology provides an opportunity for the discerning assessment of contemporary American ideas about the role of the leading parties in the foreign policy process. The mechanism of intervention by the bourgeois parties in the engineering and conduct of foreign policy through the hiring and placement of personnel, congressional factions, and so forth is described in the foreword. In line with Marxist-Leninist methodology, the authors do not confine themselves to this description and present a historical analysis of the functioning of the party system of American imperialism in the foreign policy sphere in the last two centuries.

The compilers chose a broader period than the one covered by the author of the scientific-analytical survey of Soviet historical research. The first two surveys in the anthology deal with the initial period of the American Government's existence and the Civil War years. The outlines of American capitalism's expansionist policy were already visible even then. As the capitalism of free competition turned into imperialism, as the third survey, written by L.V. Baybakova, reveals, American ruling circles made a particularly sharp turn toward expansion, supplementing foreign policy based on force with the methods of economic penetration.

At the turn of the century the Republican Party was the chief promoter of expansionist ideas. Bourgeois researchers allege that the Democrats, in contrast to the

Republicans relying on military force, preferred "peaceful" means of attaining expansionist goals. It would be wrong to deny the existence of some differences between the two parties, but they were of a more specific nature. Whenever the Democrats were in charge, they continued to secure the interests of big business—with methods that were tactically somewhat different from Republican methods but strategically just as aggressive. This is described in detail in the survey "The Foreign Policy Aspects of the Inter-Party Struggle in the United States During the Period Between the Spanish-American War and World War I."

The isolationism in U.S. foreign policy from 1933 to 1945 is analyzed in the next survey. The author, Ye.V. Kurochkina, stresses that these years marked a turning point in U.S. history. It was during this period that the preconditions were established for the main economic, political, and ideological trends characteristic of the current phase in the development of American society. The foreign policy of the United States shifted from isolationism to claims to world domination.

V.A. Sarychev comments on several American works discussing the role of parties and groups in Congress in foreign policy decisionmaking. Some American authors have concluded that separate groups of congressmen have more influence than the party factions in Congress during discussions of foreign policy issues. According to a study by J. Schneider, there are two distinct approaches in Congress to foreign policy issues—conservative and liberal (p 173).

One of the main topics of contemporary studies of U.S. history is still the failure of the American aggression in Indochina and its aftermath. This was the reason for the inclusion of a survey of the party political struggle in the United States over foreign policy strategies during the Vietnam War. Its author directs attention to the efforts of bourgeois researchers discussing the events of those years to surmount the "Vietnam syndrome" in American minds. The tendentiousness of their approach causes them to overlook the real causes of the crisis of the American political system.

Information of great interest to the Soviet reader can be found in the survey of the memoirs of presidents R. Nixon, G. Ford, and J. Carter and of a book by American journalist R. Scheer, based in part on lengthy interviews with R. Reagan. In spite of their understandable tendentiousness, the presidential memoirs reveal some of the features of the White House political kitchen that are usually concealed from public view.

Nixon's memoirs, for example, indicate that the efforts to relax tension in relations with the Soviet Union were widely supported by the American public and by many members of U.S. ruling circles. From the very beginning, however, there was also strong opposition to detente in

the United States, and this opposition, according to Nixon, began inhibiting the development of Soviet-American relations in around 1973 (p 211).

Ford also admits that he constantly felt mounting pressure from the right wing of his party, especially in matters pertaining to relations with socialist countries. During the 1976 campaign Ford felt the full force of the "challenge from the Right." To seize the initiative, the leader of the Republican right wing, Ronald Reagan, made foreign policy one of the central topics of his campaign, accusing previous administrations of being "too soft," of "making concessions to the Russians," etc.

An interesting feature of Carter's memoirs is the belated admission that his artificial exaggeration of the problem of "human rights" in the socialist countries created friction in American-Soviet relations and prevented the resolution of problems in curbing the arms race (p 221).

The central link of Reagan's foreign policy strategy was the program to "rearm" America. It is connected with huge military expenditures and with an entire group of politico-ideological and military-strategic theories. The program was aimed at making the United States militarily superior to the USSR and changing the social order in our country and other socialist countries. The "neoconservatives" were as unequal to this grandiose task as their predecessors, however, and Washington had to make adjustments in its treatment of the Soviet Union.

The traditional type of scientific information contained in anthologies of summaries of research works has its merits. These are distinguished by highly concentrated information but are difficult for non-specialists to comprehend at times. For the sufficiently informed researcher needing a supply of new and valuable data, however, this labor-consuming genre can offer extremely valuable assistance in keeping track of the pulse and dynamics of the development of scientific thinking in a particular field. The work "Istoriya vneshney politiki i diplomatii SShA (1776-1917)" is typical in this respect. It examines individual works by bourgeois scholars indicating the prevailing Western interpretations of the history of U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy from the War of Independence to World War I. Although the group of works summarized here is limited, the collection includes a bibliography (around 80 titles) of the newest literature on this subject matter published abroad since 1970.

The foreword says that the anthology should aid in forming conclusions about recent foreign studies containing useful information. From the standpoint of scientific objectivity, the summaries in the collection are not of equal value, especially in the methodological sense. Bourgeois authors frequently draw tendentious and scientifically invalid conclusions from valid historical facts, and this obviously obligates Soviet scientists and readers to take a discerning approach to their conclusions and judgments.

Regardless of the philosophical views of the authors whose works are analyzed in the anthology (and the concepts and interpretations summarized here retain their original implications), we must admit that the INION of the USSR Academy of Sciences is doing an extremely necessary and useful job. We know that our historical science, just as several other social sciences, is the victim of stagnation. Some scientists confine their activity to the "exposure" of the pseudo-scientific theories of bourgeois historians without attempting any genuine analysis of sources or trying to keep up with new works written from a genuinely Marxist-Leninist vantage point. The three scientific informational publications we have discussed here will perceptibly expand the informational and evaluative basis for researchers of American foreign policy and diplomacy.

We can only hope that the history division of the INION of the USSR Academy of Sciences will not stop here but will continue this work with heightened intensity. The expansion of the range of fields of U.S. foreign policy research would be desirable. Under present conditions it is extremely important for the Soviet reader and researcher to have access to works describing U.S. approaches to major international issues. In our opinion, this would accelerate the Soviet specialist's familiarization with foreign works of scientific value.

Footnotes

1. KOMMUNIST, 1987, No 8, p 18.
2. "Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1986, p 132.
3. For a more detailed discussion of I.L. Sheydina's monograph, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1984, No 8, pp 109-115—Ed.

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Review of Two U.S. Books on Military, Arms Issues

18030003e Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 87 (signed to press 20 Oct 87) pp 101-104

[Review by N.N. Glagolev of books "Balance of Terror. Nuclear Weapons and the Illusion of Security" by Edgar Bottome, Boston, Beacon Press, 1986, 357 pages, and "The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy" by Tom Gervasi, New York, Harper and Row Publishers, 1986, 545 pages: "A Doomed Policy"]

[Text] These books belong to the category of works whose authors are firmly convinced that the nuclear arms race has not brought the world a single step closer

to greater security and that the continuation of forceful confrontations will lead unavoidably to worldwide catastrophe. "By the middle of the 1950's," Bottome writes, "the world had entered an era in which the balance of power could no longer serve as the organizing principle of relations between nuclear powers. A balance of terror came into being. In the middle of the 1980's, with more than 50,000 nuclear warheads in the world, states can no longer hope to protect their population effectively. Concepts of national security no longer exist: They have been replaced by different levels of national danger" (p 11).

With the aid of a comprehensive analysis of the driving forces of the arms race and an explanation of the false, distorted, and deliberately confused ideas about various aspects of this race, the American author proves that its curtailment is the only solution. To put an end to the arms race, and especially to reverse it, he writes, we must find the answers to three fundamental questions which have been given too little attention in the last 40 years. What function are nuclear forces supposedly performing or supposed to perform in the pursuit of foreign policy? Under what conditions will these weapons be used? How did we find ourselves in the current blind alley of nuclear overkill?

The search for answers to these questions logically leads the author to an analysis of American foreign policy theories and their role in foreign policy. "The most amazing fact," in his words, is that "at the beginning of the nuclear age it was precisely the United States that initiated the development of new types of weapons and the means of their delivery." It was precisely the United States, Bottome writes, that was "the first to build and explode an atomic bomb (1945), the first to build and use intercontinental bomber aviation (the B-36 in 1951 and 1952), the first to develop the concept of 'forward basing' and to deploy bombers carrying nuclear weapons near Soviet territory (the B-47), the first in the world to test a hydrogen bomb, the first to develop tactical nuclear weapons for use on the battlefield, the first to arm itself with medium-range ballistic missiles and to surround the territory of the Soviet Union with them, the first to arm itself with ICBM's, the first to develop submarine-launched missiles, the first to install MIRV's on ICBM's and SLBM's, and the first to develop an enhanced radiation operational and tactical weapon (the neutron bomb)."

It was precisely the United States, and not the Soviet Union, the author concludes, that saw the nuclear weapon as one of the principal means of attaining its "clear and amazingly consistent" foreign policy goals: "Since 1945 the United States has never deviated from its line of maintaining the status quo in all non-communist and non-socialist countries. This policy was supposed to secure American control of world resources and cheap labor and guarantee unimpeded access to spheres of trade and investment" (p 14).

In a revolutionary world, however, it is not easy to maintain the status quo, Bottome remarks, citing the U.S. failures in China, Cuba, Vietnam, and Nicaragua. And instead of admitting that the Third World had entered an age of revolution and that the United States was incapable of containing the powerful forces of history, the United States responded "by militarizing its foreign policy even more and by investing new hopes in nuclear weapons." After the Korean War, John Foster Dulles' policy of "massive retaliation" was announced. The failure in the Bay of Pigs paved the way for Robert McNamara's "counterforce strike" and "flexible response." After the Vietnam War Nixon's "controlled response" and Carter's "counterforce strategy" came into being and were followed by Reagan's "winnable nuclear war," reinforced by the "Star Wars" program (p 15). The means were different, but the end, the author stresses, was still the same: the use of nuclear weapons in such a way as to exclude the possibility of foreign policy failures in the future. "The United States is still a victim of the traditional belief that more weapons produce more reliable security."

This belief, the author remarks, has been vigorously supported by the military-industrial complex: "Even in the first years of the arms race the forces favoring a larger military budget concluded that the most effective way of obtaining new military appropriations was to convince Congress that the USSR was on the threshold of developing a new weapon system and that American security might be at risk" (p 37). The "bomber," "technology," and "missile" gaps that were invented in this manner, the differences in military spending, and the "window of vulnerability" were used successfully for the dramatic augmentation of military spending. In 1982, for example, the Reagan Administration discerned a "discrepancy" between U.S. and Soviet military spending and demanded an increase of 6.6 percent with adjustments for inflation in defense spending on this basis.¹ The most amazing part of this, the author says, is that those who invented, exaggerated, and carefully maintained the myths about all types of gaps and "windows of vulnerability" were never called to account for this and never suffered the slightest political injury.

In the activities of the postwar American administrations, from Eisenhower to Reagan, the author discerns a clear desire to tip the "balance of terror that had taken shape between the USSR and the United States by 1956" and to change the alignment of forces in the United States' favor with the aim of gaining first-strike capability.

Today, however, one of the universally recognized realities of the "balance of terror" is the fact that, given the tremendous number of nuclear warheads and abundance of delivery systems, a surprise first strike does not have even a remote chance of depriving the opponent of the ability to launch an effective retaliatory strike. In view of this fact, the Reagan Administration's massive military buildup can mean only one thing, Bottome says: "The United States is openly arming itself with the first-strike

strategy and simultaneously creating superior nuclear forces to keep the Soviet Union from counteracting American operations" (p 194). To convince the public of the need to follow this dangerous and costly path, American leaders have had to maintain that U.S. nuclear forces are defensive. "Although the right wing in the United States has always portrayed conflict with the Soviet Union as a confrontation between democratic capitalism and 'godless' Soviet totalitarianism, Reagan went even further by christening the Soviet Union the 'evil empire' and raising this kind of conflict to the level of a struggle between 'the just and the unjust' or 'good and evil'" (p 218). Against an enemy this evil, the author sarcastically says, the use of any weapon whatsoever is permissible as long as the right side wins.

Bottome also regards the Star Wars program as an integral part of first-strike strategy, stressing that the endless discussions about the technical feasibility of its various components have obscured the main issue or at least made it appear secondary: What function is the SDI supposed to perform? The author states categorically that the purpose of Star Wars is not defense, but the delivery of the final blow after a surprise attack. "If a U.S. first strike destroys 1,200 of the 1,500 Soviet missile launchers, 300 missiles can be used in a retaliatory strike. Their elimination will be one of the functions of the SDI system. Therefore, it is expected to destroy not 100 percent of the Soviet offensive missiles, but only the 20 percent remaining after a surprise U.S. attack" (p 210). The SDI is also dangerous because it can encourage "the use of tactical nuclear weapons by the United States for the attainment of its goals in a constantly changing revolutionary world" (p 211).

Unfortunately, Bottome is essentially betrayed by the inner logic of his analysis and makes generalizations that contradict the facts he has cited. With numerous examples of actions by postwar American administrations, the author proves that each new escalation of the arms race has invariably been initiated by the United States and that the Soviet Union has had to take countermeasures to strengthen its defensive capabilities and has pursued a policy of "minimal deterrence" throughout all of these years (p 42). In spite of all this, the author makes the following statement: "Instead of admitting the immutable fact that the longer the arms race goes on, the less secure all nations will be, the United States and the Soviet Union persist in adhering to the traditional belief that more weapons produce more reliable security" (p 311).

More consistent judgments and conclusions are stated by Director Tom Gervasi of the Harvard University Defense Analysis and Research Center, the author of the second book reviewed in this article, who exposes the myth serving as the justification for the arms race, the myth of Soviet military supremacy. The author gathered huge quantities of documented information, including official government data and the proceedings of various

congressional hearings on the balance of power between the USSR and the United States and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in nuclear and conventional arms and has conducted numerous computations. "I am an American who sincerely believes that our nation should have a strong defense," Gervasi writes. "I discovered that we already have it. Throughout our history America has had a strong defense. It is just as effective today as it was 5 years ago, when the new administration made statements to the contrary and promised to rearm America. To this end, it put too heavy and senseless a load of military expenditures on the American people. They were willing to bear it and would bear even greater difficulties if there were some reason to do so. But there is none" (p 4).

Like Bottome, Gervasi says that if deterrence had been the real purpose of the United States, it could have stopped the nuclear arms race without jeopardizing its security in the slightest back in the 1950's, when it had several hundred nuclear warheads and the means of their delivery. "Why then should the preparations to counteract a threat continue when more than enough weapons exist for this purpose? Why is the government deceiving the public and urging it to support absolutely unjustified efforts?" Because, the author answers, "there is no other way of satisfying the demands of the military-industrial complex, which has become the most influential force in our society. This complex is influential not because it appeals to our patriotism and exploits our desire to safeguard our own security. Its power is based on accumulated wealth. The more money it controls, the more dependent businessmen, workers, and the administration are on it. With an annual defense budget of 300 billion dollars at its disposal, the military establishment has acquired unprecedented power—just the kind of power it was striving for when it insisted on higher military appropriations" (p 38). The rise in military spending, Gervasi adds, is justified by a mounting military threat, and this means that "they have to tell lies more frequently and more brazenly" (p 39).

The authors of both books can see that this policy is completely doomed and they agree that the way to achieve real security consists in the renunciation of harmful myths and the commencement of serious and honest talks on disarmament.

Footnotes

1. The author says that only military appropriations are calculated with adjustments for inflation in the United States: This means that their real growth can be concealed. Expenditures on social programs are calculated without this kind of adjustment. Therefore, if the rate of inflation in a particular year is 5 percent and the increase in the defense budget is 6.6 percent, the total increase is 11.6 percent. If we consider that the program of aid to families with dependent children is calculated in percentage relationships to the previous year without

adjustments for inflation, an increase of 2 percent in expenditures on this program with a 5-percent rate of inflation will mean a reduction of 3 percent in the program (p 205).

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Review of Armand Hammer Book

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[Review by A.F. Sidoruk (New York) of book "Hammer. Witness to History" by Armand Hammer with Neil Lyndon, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1987, 554 pages]

[Text] "My life has been filled with feverish activity rather than quiet contemplation. I always believed that the individual finds his highest form of self-expression in the creative endeavors absorbing all of the strength of our imagination and intellect." Armand Hammer, who is well known in the Soviet Union as a prominent representative of the American business community and the chairman of the board of Occidental Petroleum, begins his autobiography with these words.

His book, which he wrote in collaboration with journalist N. Lyndon, is called simply "Hammer." A book describing the life of one of the greatest U.S. industrialists naturally devotes some space to the uncompromising battles in which Occidental Petroleum crushed its competitors in Libya and Iran when these countries were headed by monarchic regimes. It confirms the brutality of the laws of competition, in which only the strongest survive. Separate chapters deal with the performance of U.S. presidents of different eras—Franklin Roosevelt and John Kennedy—and largely through the prism of American-Soviet relations.

Most of the book, however, describes Hammer's business contacts with the USSR and his meetings with Soviet leaders, and this is probably the most interesting part of the book. Most of these events followed a logical sequence. After Armand Hammer concluded a major economic agreement with the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1970's, an agreement covering the period up to the end of the 20th century, he took the lead among American businessmen in terms of the scales of commercial contacts with the USSR.

The chapter in which this businessman, who has lived to a venerable age and still has enviable energy (Hammer was born in New York on 21 May 1898), discusses his family tree is interesting in this context. His grandfather Jacob was "the son of a rich shipbuilder in Kherson" and his grandmother was the daughter of "an extremely

prosperous merchant" from Yelizavetgrad (now Kirovograd). In the 1880's, "in the fear of Jewish pogroms" and "in search of prosperity," they emigrated to America with their children.

Armand Hammer spent his childhood in New York. His father Julius, according to his son, was an active member of the Socialist Party of the United States. His grandmother Victoria, who "arrived in America from Russia with radical convictions and a hatred for authority," had considerable influence in shaping his views. Eventually, as documents testify, Julius became one of John Reed's comrades-in-arms and attended the constituent congress of the Communist Labor Party of America in 1919 (it merged with the Communist Party of America in 1921).

This radicalism irritated the younger Hammer. "I always felt that he (father) and his friends were living in the old world of the pogroms and did not understand the new world of America," he writes. "All my life I was puzzled by his views, and he by mine. Although we never expressed our anger, we were never able to understand each other." The younger Hammer amused himself in those years by reading only biographies of great American businessmen, such as Rockefeller and Vanderbilt.

Idealizing the activities of the giant magnates of American business, Hammer decided to follow in their footsteps when he was still a child. He proved to have an extraordinary talent for business and commercial acumen and "suddenly" acquired millions while he was still a student when he took his father's place as the co-owner of the Allied Drug and Chemical Company, a pharmaceutical firm which had been experiencing serious financial difficulties. His secret was a simple one: As he tells it, the younger Hammer began engaging in the illegal sale of sweet beverages with a dash of liquor on a broad scale.

Soon the 23-year-old millionaire, a graduate of the Columbia University School of Medicine, made a decision which, by his own admission, was a turning point in his life. Dreaming of "gaining precious experience in the fight against typhus," which was rife at the beginning of the 1920's, he went to Soviet Russia. Hammer writes: "The land of my forefathers beckoned to me." In reality, his nostalgia was a perfect complement to the mercantilism representing the basis of all business. It is no coincidence that the chapter of the autobiography about his arrival in our country bears the eloquent title "Business Romance with Russia." In July 1921 he arrived in Moscow after a difficult journey through London, Berlin, and Riga. A month later, after touring the disaster zones, Hammer returned to Moscow. In his book he describes the amazing changes in the appearance of the city in this short time:

"I could not believe my eyes. Was this the same Moscow...I had left just recently? ...My traveling companions were just as surprised and also tried to find out what had happened. 'Nep, nep,' they were told."

"This was the new economic policy announced by V.I. Lenin.... Only he could have advanced this kind of policy, representing one of the most astounding and decisive changes in the history of our century," Hammer writes. "V.I. Lenin had to appeal to the colossal sense of trust the people felt for him." After his return to Moscow, Hammer had the good fortune of seeing V.I. Lenin, who had heard that the young American businessman was in Russia and wanted to meet him personally. Hammer describes the man who, in his words, "saved the revolution with a single wave of his hand":

"Lenin rose from his desk and walked toward me. He was shorter than I expected, a stocky man with a big head and a red beard. He was wearing a dark-gray suit, a shirt with a soft collar, and a black tie. His eyes radiated affability and sincerity.

"'Have you traveled around Russia,' he asked me abruptly.

"I replied that I had just spent almost a month in the Urals and had been in the zones where hunger was raging.

"His face changed, and an expression of infinite grief replaced the warm interest sparkling in his eyes. At that moment I realized what a heavy burden this man was carrying.

"'Yes,' he said slowly, 'hunger....' And then he fell silent in an obvious attempt to hold back his tears.

"'The civil war,' he went on, 'ruined us, and now we have to start over. The new economic policy demands the redevelopment of our economic capabilities, and we hope to step up this process with the practice of foreign industrial concessions. Have you given this any thought?'"

V.I. Lenin offered the American businessman a concession for an asbestos mine in the Urals. When Hammer expressed the fear that the preliminary negotiations could last several months, Lenin declared that bureaucracy "is one of the scourges of our society. I tell them this over and over again. Here is what I will do now. I will appoint a special committee of two. One will be connected with the Commissariat of Worker and Peasant Inspections and the other will be from the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission. They will take the matter under advisement and assist you in any way they can. You can be certain that they will take quick action. Everything will be done right away. We realize that we have to guarantee concessionaires favorable terms. It would be ridiculous to think of capitalists as philanthropists. They want to make a profit, and if they can be certain of this they will invest their capital in Russia."

"Lenin kept his word," Hammer stresses. In this way, "in an unbelievably short time," the businessman who had come to ravaged Russia to trade bread in exchange

for furs and minerals also became the first American to have a concession here. (Hammer maintained extensive commercial contacts with the Soviet Union until 1930, particularly as the owner of a pencil factory. Now this is the Sacco and Vanzetti Factory.)

"When my thoughts carry me back to this memorable meeting many years ago," Hammer writes, "I make an intense effort to recall what impressed me the most. It seems to me that when I first walked into V.I. Lenin's office, I was impressed by the tremendous respect his followers had for him. In any case, I expected to meet a superhuman. But everything was just the opposite. Talking to Lenin was just like talking to a loyal friend who understands you. His infectious smile and lively speech put me completely at ease."

Hammer returns to his description of V.I. Lenin several times in his book, adding more and more new details and making generalizations based on his unforgettable personal impressions. He mentions, among other features of the leader of the revolution, his "astounding intellectual breadth": "Lenin judged world events from the standpoint of a world leader. He combined the keen mind of a statesman with a knowledge of history and a thorough understanding of world politics." The entire world was easily comprehensible to him, Hammer adds with admiration.

In his discussion of Lenin the thinker, he describes the mental associations the leader of the revolution derived from a figurine which the American businessman had bought in London and which he presented to Lenin during their brief meeting in May 1922. It was a statue of a monkey sitting on C. Darwin's book and examining a human skull.

"Lenin," Hammer recalls, "was very intrigued by the symbolism of this little statue and made an extremely insightful observation. As the weapons of war become increasingly destructive, he said, civilization could be destroyed if man does not learn to live in peace. There could come a time, he went on, when a monkey living on earth will pick up a human skull and wonder where it came from. Lenin talked about this 23 years before the first atomic bomb was set off."

Hammer discusses the survival of mankind in the nuclear-space age several times in his autobiography, particularly in connection with the accident in Chernobyl. "After the explosion of the Chernobyl reactor," he writes, "I felt a connection with my past, and my adult life came full circle. I offered medical assistance to alleviate the consequences of this disaster in just the same way as when I arrived in this country in 1921."

In a chapter which he says he began writing after the book had been completed and he had organized a trip to the USSR for the bone marrow specialists headed by

Robert Gale, Hammer writes about the lessons of Chernobyl. His description of his meeting with General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev in the Kremlin in May 1986 is the centerpiece of the chapter.

Hammer goes on to share his impressions of a flight over Chernobyl in summer 1986. Evaluating the assistance the Soviet people received from the American physicians, Hammer notes that "in the general context of relations between the USSR and the United States, the work performed in the Moscow hospital by Gale's group was only a small step toward peace, but this step was taken. Russians and Americans worked together and this aroused feelings of mutual respect and affection. The foundation was laid for the exchange of medical information which could help us prevent this kind of disaster in the future."

"This was an example of a show of American goodwill at a time when some of our newspapers were printing the wildest stories and arousing the anger of the Russians," THE NEW YORK TIMES review of Hammer's biography says.

Even in the 1930's, when Hammer did not maintain any kind of commercial contact with the Soviet Union, he supported Roosevelt's plan for the diplomatic recognition of our country. In 1961, during a period of strained relations between the United States and the USSR, he visited our country again, as a private citizen but at the request of President Kennedy. And he is probably correct in saying that he thereby laid "a small stone in the foundation of better relations between the White House and the Kremlin." There is no question that Hammer's idea of "detente through trade" warrants approval.

The best description of Hammer's philosophy of life is probably provided by Hammer himself in the chapter entitled "Big Business and the Soviets": "When Western reporters ask me how I feel when I am in Russia, I always tell them what I tell the Russians. I am a capitalist and I believe that our system is better than their system, but I want us to coexist peacefully so that history can decide which of our systems is the best." The final words of Hammer's autobiography are a logical extension of this belief: "We must find a way of protecting ourselves and future generations from a nuclear cataclysm. We are responsible for the future of the planet and the human race."

Footnotes

1. For more about V.I. Lenin's meetings with Armand Hammer, see: Lenin, V.I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vols 53, 54, and "V.I. Lenin. Biograficheskaya khronika" [V.I. Lenin. Biographical Chronicle], Moscow, 1970-1985, vols 11, 12—Ed.

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Review of Book on UN Role in International Relations

18030003g Moscow SSHA: *EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA* in Russian No 11, Nov 87 (signed to press 20 Oct 87) pp 107-108

[Review by A.Ya. Nekrasov of book "OON i sovremennyye mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya" [United Nations and Contemporary International Relations], edited by G.L. Zhukov, Moscow, Nauka, 1986, 286 pages]

[Text] This book discusses the major world issues concerning the United Nations in the 1980's. These are arms control, the prevention of nuclear war, keeping the peace, the regulation of the activities of states in the world ocean, the peaceful use of outer space, environmental protection, the role of non-governmental international organizations, and many others. An important analytical aspect of the book is the comprehensive survey of the policy of the USSR and other socialist countries toward the United Nations, their consistent and constructive policy of supporting all of this organization's efforts to solve the global problems of humanity, especially the problems of maintaining and consolidating peace and public security. The book stresses that the Soviet Union believes that the United Nations' potential as a peace-keeping organization, as recorded in its charter, is far from exhausted.

In my opinion, the book is not devoid of a few shortcomings. For example, it is regrettable that it does not include any chapters on socioeconomic cooperation. It is obvious that all aspects of UN activity, including socioeconomic, international-legal, and sociohumanitarian, are of political significance and it is therefore hardly valid to say that, in addition to the political areas of UN activity, there are non-political ones (the authors regard socioeconomic and scientific-technical areas of activity as such). In connection with this, we must say that, for example, social issues and the organization of cooperation in the sociohumanitarian sphere have always been among the charter obligations of the United Nations. Economic, sociohumanitarian, and international-legal issues have been discussed more actively in the United Nations in recent years, especially after the 41st session of the General Assembly approved the resolution of the socialist countries on the creation of a comprehensive system of international peace and security.

Several problems (the ecological crisis, for example) are oversimplified to some degree in the book, and the authors do not describe the atmosphere in which these problems are discussed and the nuances in the positions of different countries.

The value of this monographic study would also be enhanced if the accurate statement of certain facts (for example: "The military staff committee envisaged in the

UN Charter has been inactive since 1947, and the system of collective security was never implemented") were to be supplemented with more detailed information about the efforts made by countries in this area and with recommendations for future action.

It would have been better if other sections of the book had also contained recommendations and ideas about ways of intensifying future UN efforts to develop international cooperation in various spheres and the steps that should be taken to act on the proposals of Soviet delegations in various fields of UN activity. Without all of this, the book seems more like a reference work or a register of past accomplishments.

In general, however, the monograph seems to confirm that the United Nations is capable of solving many world problems. From this standpoint, the work will be of interest and value to anyone interested in contemporary international relations.

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Review of Book on Interdependence of Today's World

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[Review by I.S. Korolev of book "Vsemirnoye khozyaystvo: tendentsii, sdvigi i protivorechiya" [The World Economy: Trends, Changes, and Contradictions] by N.P. Shmelev, edited by Yu.I. Bobrakov, Moscow, Nauka, 1987, 204 pages]

[Text] This book by N.P. Shmelev stands out among recent Soviet works on the world economy for several reasons.

Above all, it attracts attention because of its multifaceted nature. The author does not confine his analysis to the sphere of foreign economic relations but also examines processes occurring directly within the production sphere of the two social systems. This interpretation of the world economy broadens his subject matter to include the conservation of resources, scientific and technical progress, changes in investment processes, and tendencies in the internationalization of production. Of course, the author is mainly concerned with an analysis of international economic relations, the new forms of competition in world markets, and the intergovernmental regulation of world economic processes, including the use of integrative methods. Some sections of the book deal specifically with the economic relations of the USSR and other socialist states with capitalist and developing countries.

The second impressive feature of the book is the very approach the author takes to complex world economic problems. He does not try to pass his opinions off as the only possible point of view. He discusses the opinions of other Soviet experts in detail. In general, he has been able to avoid a onesided approach to these processes and has illustrated the interdependence and interconditionality of their development.

The third distinctive feature is that trends in the world capitalist economy are not examined in isolation, but from the standpoint of the economic problems the USSR is facing and with consideration for the changes taking place in economic and foreign economic ties and the introduction of new forms of cooperation with foreign countries. For this reason, although most of the book deals with processes occurring in capitalist countries, especially the United States, the author is completely justified in calling the book "The World Economy."

The book by N.P. Shmelev is also arousing interest because the contemporary capitalist economy is now in a transitional phase of its development. The acceleration of scientific and technical progress and the introduction of new types of technology (resource-, energy-, and labor-saving) are already having a serious effect on the balance of power in world markets and are changing economic management practices on the level of the individual firm and on the macrolevel. The book contains a detailed description of how the scientific and technical revolution is changing the conditions of international specialization and accelerating integration processes in today's world. Currency and financial matters, the internationalization of capital markets, and trends in the sphere of international indebtedness are discussed at length. The author is indisputably correct in his assertion that monetary relations are swiftly becoming an "independent source of economic confusion for capitalism" (p 130). At the same time (and this, in my opinion, is particularly valuable), the author demonstrates that many of these problems are only external symptoms of the entire set of difficulties the world capitalist economy is experiencing. The debt crisis, for example, is largely the result of the transfer to new conditions of economic management in the world economy. In turn, this crisis is aiding in the accomplishment of this transition, because advanced, particularly high-technology, sectors are in a better financial position than the old traditional sectors; this is accelerating the process by which inefficient enterprises and production units are crowded out of the economic sphere. The same is true of relations between the center and the periphery of the capitalist economy. Many developing countries have still not been able to adapt to the new requirements of international division of labor or to find their place among the suppliers of new types of products.

We cannot agree with all of the author's statements. In particular, in many places he exaggerates, in my opinion, the power of U.S. economic policy: for example, in lowering world oil prices in the second half of the 1980's

(pp 118-119). This decline was largely a result of structural changes in the world energy supply and the perceptible reduction in the relative consumption of energy, including oil, in the leading capitalist countries, which created a surplus of oil in the marketplace.

The causes of long-term trends in the world economy are primarily objective. It would be more correct to say that U.S. economic policy is effective when the United States takes these objective factors into account. When these factors are ignored, however, even the United States (in spite of its economic power) cannot accomplish anything. The author himself provides conclusive proof of this in his analysis of the changes in the U.S. approach to government intervention in the economy. As an advocate of a more important role for competition, including in international economic relations, the United States is not decreasing its intervention in economic affairs. And there is no point in even discussing this kind of decrease now that the deficit in the federal budget in relation to the gross national product has reached a record high, now that the exchange rate of the dollar, import restrictions, and export controls are being vigorously manipulated, and now that American corporations and municipal bodies are being subsidized on a massive scale.

The author's statement that "the scales of indebtedness in the developing countries could be used by the movement for a new economic order as a means of exerting pressure on imperialism" (p 187) also seems dubious. It is more likely that the opposite will happen, that the debts will be used by the West to impose a specific model of economic growth on the developing countries and to improve conditions for the operations of transnational corporations in these countries.

The groundlessness of the policy of sanctions and embargoes, instituted by the United States and other Western countries against the socialist states, is demonstrated conclusively, although, of course, this policy cannot fail to hurt all of the members of the international community. The discriminatory policy of the United States is not confined to East-West economic relations. Restrictions in trade show up in other sectors of foreign economic relations. A recent trade act, for example, effectively extends stringent government controls to the trade between Western countries and between Western and developing states. For this reason, existing problems in the economic relations of socialist states, whether with the West or the South, must be resolved for several reasons, including the need to normalize the international system of economic ties. Conversely, the USSR and other socialist states have a direct interest in the stabilization of these ties and the democratic resolution of all international economic problems.

Guarantees of international economic security are discussed in the final part of the book. This topic is made relevant by more than just the current unfavorable conditions in the world economy. The reinforcement of negative long-range tendencies and processes and the

increasingly frequent signs of a return to nationalism in foreign economic policy are alarming. The resolution of these problems will necessitate a qualitatively new level of international cooperation, based on the shared responsibility of all countries for the future of our planet.

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Review of Three Books on U.S. Foreign Politics
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[Reviews by V.A. Kremen'yuk of book "Politika SShA v Yugo-Vostochnoy Azii" [U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia] by V.S. Rudnev, Moscow, Nauka, 1986, 185 pages; by V.M. Grishina of book "Kriticheskiye napravleniya nemarksistskoy istoriografii SShA XX veka" [Critical Currents in Non-Marxist Historical Works on 20th-Century United States] by V.V. Sogrin, Moscow, Nauka, 1987, 270 pages; and by L.F. Lebedeva of book "Amerikano-yaponskiye protivorechiya v 80-ye gody" [American-Japanese Conflicts in the 1980's] by A.B. Parkanskiy, Moscow, Nauka, 1987, 152 pages]

[Text]

U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia

The author concentrates on an important aspect of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia: He reveals how the numerous "lessons of Vietnam" have influenced the actions of American leaders. This is far from idle conversation because it bears a direct relationship to the interpretation of the current ideas of U.S. military theorists and career servicemen—"neoglobalism," "horizontal escalation," "low-intensity conflicts," etc.

American policy in this region under the Carter and Reagan administrations is analyzed with special care: The author underscores the tremendous role played in policymaking by the views of rightwing and ultra-rightwing Americans dissatisfied with the "defeatist attitude" of Democratic administrations and promoting the idea of revenge.

The author thoroughly examines the process of the militarization of U.S. policy in the region. Whereas in the past, he writes, there was an emphasis on direct U.S. aggression against the people of Indochina, in our day there is an intensive buildup of military assistance and all-round support for military bureaucracies in the ASEAN countries and the fueling of a conflict between them and the countries of Indochina. Apparently, this is how American ruling circles interpreted the "lessons of Vietnam." Assigning a central role to the methods of

military pressure, Washington has taken several politico-military steps in Southeast Asia to escalate tension and to make use of the region in its own global military-strategic plans.

Critical Currents in Non-Marxist Historical Works on 20th-Century United States

The author makes the correct observation that Soviet historians have still studied only one facet of the crisis of the bourgeois science of history—the increasing groundlessness of its theoretical and methodological position. He focuses attention on another aspect of the crisis—the increasing disillusionment of representatives of the critical currents of non-Marxist historical analysis with the capabilities of bourgeois science and their attempt to escape its confines and to emerge from the deadlock with the aid of other theoretical principles and doctrines, including historical materialism.

After a comparative analysis of these critical currents, the author concludes that a gradually ascending pattern is present in their development. Another conclusion he draws concerns the need for a differentiated approach to the representatives of these contemporary currents: It is important to draw a distinction between authors who adhere dogmatically to leftist or rightist opportunist principles and historians who have surmounted them. It is with these historians that Marxists can have a productive and creative dialogue, expanding opportunities for the scientific cognition of the historical process.

American-Japanese Conflicts in the 1980's

The monograph contains an in-depth analysis of the most recent tendencies in the economic interaction of two leading imperialist centers—the United States and Japan. The author examines problems in trade, mutual capital infiltration, and technological exchange and reveals the distinctive features of the relations between the two countries in power engineering, agriculture, and the "high technology" branches of industry. His balanced and realistic analysis of the relationship between protectionist and free-trade tendencies in U.S. trade policy and his examination of the class interests behind the clash of these views are of special interest. The author says that the rapid internationalization of reproductive processes in the United States has been accompanied by a growing realization that the effectiveness of protectionist policies is declining. The United States is now engaged in an extensive search for other methods of assuming the offensive in trade and is shifting the emphasis from the protection of its market from Japanese competition to the sweeping penetration of the Japanese market by American corporations (pp 32-34, 140). Current changes also have a politico-military aspect: The United States is worried that current trends in its competition with Japan could change the balance of power in the latter's favor and undermine the industrial and technological base of American strategic superiority.

The monograph contains new conceptual approaches to several major problems in the world capitalist economy and inter-imperialist rivalry.

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SDI Effect on Strategic Stability Viewed
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[Article by S.A. Kulik and V.N. Sergeyev: "SDI, Computers and Strategic Stability"]

[Text]

I

The idea of a layered missile defense system capable of intercepting ballistic missiles during various phases of flight lies at the basis of the "Star Wars" plan. Four phases of interception are envisaged: the missiles during the boost phase, the released bus and warheads in the post-boost phase; the released warheads in midcourse; the warheads in the terminal phase.¹

The coordination of the operations of various layers of the system and the control of missile interception are to be accomplished by the battle management subsystem, a huge set of computers performing at least the following functions: the collection, primary processing, and adjustment of missile launch data; the calculation of the trajectories of missiles and released warheads; the guidance of laser and particle beam weapons, "electromagnetic railguns," and nuclear-capable interceptor aircraft; the launching of missiles with homing non-nuclear warheads, the choice of kill time in the defense layer, the adjustment of data in accordance with the kill rate, and the repetition of operations.

During all of this, information received directly from battle stations must be coordinated with information about the overall strategic situation. This is possible only if one component of the subsystem contains a description of the current strategic situation, constantly updated and supplemented by its own sources and others that might be inaccessible to battle station sensors. Only the coordination of enemy missile launch data with the overall strategic context can draw a reliable distinction between threatening military activity by the enemy and activity of a different type—for example, the launching of satellites, meteorological rockets, etc.

The need to include a model of the strategic situation in the battle management subsystem, however, is swiftly turning it into an extremely intricate complex with elements of artificial intelligence. This fact has been acknowledged by the engineers of the SDI in the United

States and has been the subject of numerous debates, because the creation of the management subsystem will entail many problems in light of these requirements.

II

According to a commission formed by the White House in 1983 and chaired by J. Fletcher, the effectiveness of the entire antimissile system will depend on the first layer of defense. It "will be of crucial importance in the functioning of the entire system."² Virtually all of the known supporters of the "Star Wars" program agree with this.

The first layer has at least three "advantages" advertised by the U.S. administration: The first is that the missile itself, with all of its warheads, is destroyed in the boost phase (the number of targets increases by tens or even hundreds of times in midcourse).³

The second is the relative ease with which a launched missile can be detected and tracked in the boost phase because of the intensive infrared rays emitted by the booster. The detection of warheads and decoys is much more difficult after they have been released from the bus.

The third "advantage" stems from the much larger size of the missile in comparison to the warheads, which simplifies the destruction of the target.

It is assumed that without the effective functioning of the first layer of defense, the ability of subsequent layers to intercept targets will be diminished considerably. This is why American official documents speak of the need to destroy up to 90 percent of the missiles in boost phase, in order to secure the "survivability" of the entire system.⁴

The development and perfection of weapons systems for use in the first layer as the most important link of the broad-scale antimissile system are assigned tremendous significance in the program of SDI research and development. This was corroborated by General J. Abrahamson, director of the SDI Organization.⁵

The designers of the SDI and the majority of American specialists, however, admit that the effectiveness of the first layer of the antimissile system will be limited primarily by the time factor, and this was also pointed out by the Fletcher panel. The fact is that, according to official American data, the ICBM boost phase lasts only about 4 or 5 minutes. The improvement of the missile could reduce it to 180 seconds. And this is not even the minimum. As one study by an American corporation producing ICBM's says, the boost phase could be reduced to 50 seconds in the near future.⁶

In connection with this, many American specialists who oppose the SDI have asked how the time limit of a few dozen seconds on decisionmaking can be combined reasonably with the U.S. leadership's announcement

that strategic nuclear forces will be used only for retaliation. Can the ABM system with space-based layers be set in motion within a few seconds without certain preliminary preparations, which are excluded by the situation of a retaliatory strike? Will there be enough time for human participation in decisionmaking or will everything be decided by machines? How reliable will the automatic battle management system be? How will all of this affect the stability of the strategic situation?

III

First let us look at the current procedures and time frame of decisionmaking by the U.S. politico-military leadership with regard to the use of nuclear weapons in the event (as American scientists view the matter) of reports of missile launchings by the other side. According to members of the Reagan Administration, it will take "a few minutes" for the data on the other side's missile launches to be processed and for the President of the United States to make the decision to launch a counterstrike.⁷ According to Western experts, just the processing of information from warning satellites would take at least 2 minutes.⁸

The mechanism for making decisions on "countermeasures" has also been discussed in the American press. After information has been received from satellites and forward-based radar installations, there will be a minute for its verification in the headquarters of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). The information will be considered reliable only if it is received from at least two elements of the warning system—satellites and radar installations. Then there will be a minute to check the operational condition of the system, and 30 seconds later the officer of the day will report the situation to the commander of NORAD (or his deputy in his absence), who will then report the data to the National Military Command Center in Washington for transmission to the President of the United States. The President will then make the decision.⁹

These procedures and time frame, according to American experts, must meet at least two conditions. First of all, the decision will be made with a view to the need to launch strategic carriers in time; for this reason, the flight time of the other side's ICBM's and SLBM's—25 to 30 minutes and 8 to 12 minutes respectively—will be taken into account. Second, there must be active human (the President and officials) participation in the process so that computer errors will not affect the system. This mechanism, however, will not, as people in the United States admit, meet the requirements of the situation following the deployment of the comprehensive ABM system envisaged in the SDI, with the exception of a situation in which the United States intends to deliver the first strike.¹⁰

When Washington officials expound on the declared concept of retaliation, they advance scenarios for putting the first layer of the defense system in motion in which

the decisionmaking process will take seconds, but this means, in the opinion of American experts, that the entire decisionmaking process must be completely automated. For example, the American Union of Concerned Scientists believes that "the problem of making a much more complex chain of decisions within seconds can only be solved if the human being is excluded from the process."¹¹ Experts also believe that the automation of the entire decisionmaking loop is dictated by the vulnerability of battle groups to the countermeasures of the other side.

The U.S. administration and its supporters are in a ticklish situation. On the one hand, the acknowledgement of the need for human participation in the decisionmaking loop is tantamount to admitting an intention to deliver a first strike against the USSR and "finishing off" all remaining strategic missiles with the aid of the antimissile system. On the other hand, the confirmation of the plans to completely automate the decisionmaking process could cause serious political problems because the idea of a fully automated decisionmaking process is associated in the minds of influential American politicians with the concept of "launch on warning"—i.e., the launching of American missiles immediately following the signal that the other side has launched missiles. It was no coincidence that this was one of the first problems to attract the attention of congressmen after Reagan's "Star Wars" speech. For example, former Congressman J. Seiberling stressed that "we will apparently have to adopt the concept of launch on warning, which will considerably increase the risk of the accidental start of a nuclear war."¹² Experts have expressed the opinion that the automation of decisionmaking will signify reliance on the simultaneous activation of the antimissile system and the launching of U.S. strategic weapons.

The U.S. administration chose the second option—the option of automated decisionmaking, avoiding participation in the debates on this issue.

Back in 1981 high-level Pentagon staffer J. Milburn was one of the first officials to admit in the Capitol that "we will delegate powers to the system itself (in this case, the space battle group— Author)."¹³ Reagan's former adviser on science and technology G. Keyworth supported the idea of the complete automation of the decisionmaking process, saying that "this amount of time (the less than 240 seconds of the ICBM boost phase—Author) is not enough for a human being to make accurate decisions." Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense R. Perle made the candid statement that "the issue of participation by the President or some other person seems secondary."¹⁴

IV

The choice of the automation option presented designers and developers with many new problems. One of the most difficult ones consists in identifying the target (the launched missile) correctly and distinguishing it from

decoys and from natural or specially created interference. The reliability of target identification can be secured only when the target is identified not by one feature (size, speed, or booster temperature), but by a group of different features; furthermore, the signals received from various types of sensors will be processed simultaneously or together to reproduce an image of the whole target. Existing means of defense and jamming equipment, however, could affect the tracking system and create a situation in which one or several data processing channels are blocked, malfunction, or produce conflicting signals. This will give rise to difficult problems in making the decision to destroy the target: Will the failure of one channel of the identification system be enough to rescind the decision to destroy the target? And what if two or more channels fail to work?

In view of the current, already high technical level of jamming equipment, these questions are among the most important issues connected with the design of the ABM system. A low operational threshold in the identification system will cause it to respond to signals having no connection with missile launches.

Programming errors could be another important source of defects in the battle management subsystem. During the initial period of the extensive discussion of the SDI program, the problem of developing software for the battle management subsystem was overlooked and did not attract any serious attention from the debating sides. The attention of both the supporters and the critics of the SDI was focused on problems in developing kinetic energy weapons, in supplying battle stations with energy, etc. Problems connected with the operational reliability of the subsystem were regarded as purely technical matters. As several scientific problems in the development of the offensive space weapon came to light, however, the technical problems which had been ignored at first began to acquire primary significance. Several serious questions were raised in new works on the development of reliable software for this subsystem.

The first important stage of the process of creating software is "planning," which represents, in the unanimous opinion, of Western experts, an extremely difficult task with numerous problems in itself, because all of the possible details of all possible situations must be foreseen and the response of the software to each possibility must be envisaged.

During the stage of the actual development of software specialists compile scenarios of the development of events and work out algorithms in the appropriate programming language. The experience of the United States indicates that errors are committed even when the most important systems are being developed. For example, there was an error in the software for the Gemini 5 manned spacecraft because the earth's movement around the sun was not taken into account; as a result, the capsule came down 100 miles (160 kilometers) from its intended landing point.

American researcher H. Lin, for example, stresses that "neither the nature nor the frequency of errors in the planning stage or the development stage can be predicted in advance. These errors can only be avoided if specialists discover them in time." In connection with this, H. Lin says that there are two effective ways of assessing the reliability of software. The first is the analytical method, in which accuracy is verified mathematically, by comparing the results of calculations with some previously formulated criteria. This method, however, is inadequate because it cannot guarantee the accuracy of the software when it receives an unforeseen signal.

The second and more important, in Lin's opinion, method is experimental testing. Obviously, a broad-scale antimissile system cannot be tested in situations approximating real conditions. And not only because colossal expenditures would be required, but, as Lin says, "what is more significant in this case is that the Soviet Union would not be able to distinguish between the launching of several experimental missiles and a real U.S. attack with complete certainty."¹⁵

The experience of the United States also testifies that when a system consisting of numerous elements is developed, problems and errors are often discovered only when the system is tested under conditions close to the extreme case, which must be created for small-scale testing. For example, as long as the existing global military command and control system of the United States, uniting in a single network all of the communication channels used by military and civilian agencies for the transmission of information and the coordination of armed forces, performs routine operations, the system functions normally. If the number of transmitted reports increases, the work of the system is disrupted. During military exercises in 1977, when it was hooked up to several other, regional command and control systems, the speed of data transmission decreased to 38 percent.¹⁶

To surmount the limitations inherent in small-scale tests, developers usually enlist the aid of modeling experts. They have to hypothesize the typical parameters of each situation to be modeled. As many American works on this subject report, however, modeling experts cannot reproduce all of the possible ways in which a nuclear conflict starts, because the adversary will choose the kind of strike that corresponds best to the situation at the given time. Furthermore, no increase in computer speed can help in modeling processes which are essentially unknown to the researcher.

Nevertheless, increasing attention is being devoted in the United States to "servicing" the software for the battle management subsystem of the projected antimissile system. Special importance is being assigned to two problems: the elimination of errors discovered after the software begins to be used, and the organization of its development.

As far as the first is concerned, this set of programs designed for the real-time processing of data will work with equipment of one specific type and will not work with other equipment, even when differences are infinitesimal; furthermore, in real-time performance it is extremely difficult to force the repetition of an error, but this will be a necessary part of locating the defect. Finally, when errors are eliminated, new ones are almost inevitable. The probability of committing a new error during the elimination of a known error is from 15 to 50 percent.¹⁷

As for the second problem, in the opinion of American researchers, the most optimistic estimates indicate that it will take more than 30,000 man-years to develop the SDI software, meaning that 3,000 specialists would have to work on this project for 10 years. Personnel turnover is unavoidable, however, and this could have a negative effect on the continuity and consistency of the work. In particular, it is almost certain that some details will be overlooked during these reassignments, such as changes in a particular subprogram.

In general, the question is not whether there will or will not be an error in the system, but how probable it is that the system will contain the potentially admissible errors among the millions possible. The issue of the "inevitability of inevitabilities"—i.e., of the potential errors which remain unpredictable—is of fundamental importance. This is why many believe that the development of a reliable management subsystem is extremely improbable while the probability of errors in the work of the antimissile system and of its accidental activation is extremely strong.

V

Justifying the prospect of automated decisionmaking and alleging that this will not lead to the start of a nuclear war through computer error, members of the administration advance three "arguments." First, they are speculating on the possibility of a "technical miracle." As the discussion above indicated, however, the main difficulty is not the reliability of the computer, but the reliability of software—i.e., the absence of algorithmic errors—which cannot be reduced to the mere problem of developing reliable supercomputers.

Second, a nuclear confrontation will supposedly start only as a result of the protracted escalation of tension, presupposing the "readiness" of the U.S. leadership to take "timely measures." In connection with this, American experts have to admit that this hypothetical scenario represents only one link of the chain of scenarios fed into military computers.

Third, there is the assumption that the functioning of the antimissile system will not lead directly to the destruction of a missile (or missiles) of the other side after an false computer alert.

It must be said, however, that all three of these "arguments" exclude from discussion the nature of some types of weapons proposed for the first layer of the missile defense system, weapons having absolutely no relationship to the declared concepts of retaliation.

Because of geographic factors and the shape of the planet, the systems of the first layer can act only from space. This is why their developers consider two types of battle groups promising: the so-called "pop-up systems" and the battle stations with offensive weapons on board, permanently stationed in geosynchronous orbits. In addition, complicated plans have been proposed for the use of space-based mirrors to aim laser weapons at enemy missiles.

The first type of system has aroused considerable interest in the United States. The most probable option is a complex with an X-ray laser launched from a submarine close to the coast of the other side, to minimize the distance between antimissile weapons and the location of the other side's launchers. According to the calculations of American scientists, because of the earth's configuration, the antimissile pop-up system, representing a weapon system for one-time use, should be located at a distance of at least 1,200 kilometers, which would require a minimum of 120 seconds to use the system from launch time.¹⁸ Furthermore, for technical reasons submarines cannot launch all existing antimissile complexes simultaneously, but only in sequence, with specific intervals (in particular, because the submarine cannot withstand the force of the simultaneous launching of all carriers). Therefore, the very concept of the pop-up system, with a view to the length of the boost phase for the other side's ICBM's, presupposes the delivery of the first nuclear strike by the side possessing an antimissile system with a first layer designed to "finish off" retaliatory forces.

Besides this, General Abrahamson has said that the antimissile system, including computers, will be activated only at a time of crisis: "If the crisis should escalate, the President will be able to make the decision in advance and might even inform the Russians: 'Very well, I am activating an important part of the system.' This means that the system will be activated automatically. I hope that this will relieve the tension."¹⁹

It is precisely during periods of crisis, however, that the delegation of powers to a computer would be most dangerous, because the potential for false alarms would be very real. In this situation any official having anything to do with the use of nuclear weapons or the antimissile system will assess the false alarm according to what the Americans call the "worst-case scenario."

The supporters of the SDI are also trying to understate the consequences of the self-activation of the battle groups of the layered defense system, but they are attempting this at a time when the SDI's developers still have not proposed a single specific weapons system

whose nature would permit the determination of these consequences. Nevertheless, the known characteristics of existing systems suggest that the consequences of errors would not be as harmless as Washington officials say.

The use of some SDI-related weapons could be interpreted by the other side as the use of strategic nuclear weapons. The launching of pop-up systems could also be regarded as the launching of strategic weapons, especially in the case of a nuclear-powered X-ray laser.

Several "Star Wars" scenarios presuppose the destruction of "space targets," which certainly implies the start of all-out nuclear warfare on the earth. The Fletcher panel's proposals regarding the automatic use of offensive weapons in the event of the creation of a comprehensive missile defense system with space-based elements, for example, include the "use of kinetic, laser, and nuclear weapons exclusively for the defense of our own targets and the use of all nuclear weapons."²⁰ It is completely obvious that the potential consequences of the use of this group of weapons, especially nuclear ones, could be catastrophic.

Other hypothetical scenarios of the self-activation of elements of the antimissile system could also be set forth, but even if we consider the truly "harmless" consequences of self-activation, it becomes obvious that they will have a negative effect on the international situation. How should the other side respond to such consequences of self-activation as infrared radiation, the intensification of communications with space vehicles, the positioning of space-based mirrors, and so forth? We must agree with Western researcher D. Dodney, who says that "instead of freeing mankind from the tightening nuclear noose, space weapons promise to lead humanity to the brink of death through machine error."²¹

As we mentioned above, the battle management subsystem of the missile defense system envisaged in the SDI unites an extremely complex group of antimissile weapons and, besides this, must contain a model of the strategic situation. This means that it must be connected directly with the system for the command and control of U.S. strategic forces. It would be difficult to imagine a situation in which the antimissile system would be activated but U.S. strategic forces would not be put on alert. Therefore, the erroneous activation of the antimissile system could lead to the abrupt escalation of strategic tension.

It is no coincidence that the group of prominent American researchers who compiled the book "The Fallacy of Star Wars" say that software should include all possible scenarios, including scenarios in which the United States delivers the first strike, and conclude: "There is no question that in the high-speed defense systems, the computer code could contain the basic plans of the national policy of the United States to start a nuclear

war."²² In other words, the self-activation of battle management, not to mention the conscious intention to deliver the first nuclear strike, certainly cannot be called a "harmless act."

American researcher J. Tucker candidly says that any delegation of activating powers to the system ("either battle stations with laser weapons will automatically make the decision to deliver a strike, or a high-ranking military official—the commander of NORAD or the commander of a space command center, for example—will be able to activate the system within 2 minutes") will "preclude the making of decisions by the President or other high-level officials. Furthermore, ...theoretically the decision could be made without the participation of the President. But this act would represent a declaration of war."²³ Tucker's suppositions reflect at least two dangers that are already arousing the anxiety of even the SDI's supporters. These are the possibility of the monopolization of decisions on the use of nuclear weapons and the activation of the defense system by the Pentagon, which already controls the warning, communications, and verification system, or of the predetermination of the nature of U.S. actions during a period of heightened international tension and the possibility of the start of a nuclear conflict by the technical specialists in charge of developing the battle management subsystem of the missile defense system. The absence of the necessary "checks and balances" in the decisionmaking mechanism will have the most negative effect on the military-strategic situation.

The current strategic situation is already distinguished by a high degree of uncertainty because of the very nature of nuclear weapons, the existence of huge stockpiles of these weapons, the complexity of command, control, and communication systems, and several other factors. The implementation of the SDI will compound this uncertainty immeasurably. The additional uncertainty introduced into the strategic and tactical plans of one side will naturally affect the degree of uncertainty for the other side, and this will diminish the stability of the existing strategic balance and increase the danger of nuclear war. Both sides have the capability for assured retaliation. In the more distant future the danger of this kind of strike will increase as a result of the United States' continued augmentation of the number of warheads and the enhancement of their accuracy and destructive potential. The implementation of the SDI, in turn, will bring this danger much closer.

This is why there is an urgent need to take resolute measures to prevent the kind of situation in which the danger of a first strike and the danger of accidental nuclear war can grow stronger and stronger.

Footnotes

1. For a more detailed discussion, see I.P. Lebedev, "The Purpose of the SDI Is Aggression," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1986, No 11—Ed.

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3. "Defense Against Ballistic Missiles. An Assessment of Technologies and Policy Implications. U.S. Department of Defense," Washington, March 1984.
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6. A. Carter, "Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space," Washington, April 1984, pp 6-7.
7. "Strategic Defense and Anti-Satellite Weapons. Hearings..., U.S. Senate," Washington, 1984, p 69.
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11. "The Fallacy of Star Wars," edited by J. Tirman, New York, 1984, p 115.
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13. Quoted in: T. Karas, "The New High Ground. Strategies and Weapons of Space-Age War," New York, 1983, p 186.
14. "Strategic Defense and Anti-Satellite Weapons. Hearings..., pp 65, 71.
15. SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, December 1985, pp 16-25.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p 22.
18. "The Fallacy of Star Wars," p 114.
19. THE ATLANTIC, June 1985, p 22.
20. Ibid., September 1985, p 15.
21. CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST, March 1984, p 93.
22. "The Fallacy of Star Wars," p 147.
23. TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, April 1984, p 45.

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Development of Conventional Weapons Examined
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[Article by V.I. Makarevskiy: "Conventional Arms"]

[Text] General-purpose forces equipped with conventional weapons represent 85-90 percent of all the armed forces personnel of the nuclear states and account for 80-90 percent of the military expenditures of these countries (and 100 percent in the case of non-nuclear countries). Whereas there are 5 nuclear states in the world, there are around 50 states with sizable armed forces consisting of 100,000 or more personnel armed with conventional weapons.

According to different sources, more than 25 million people have died in local wars and military conflicts using only conventional weapons since World War II.

The continuing arms race can be divided into a few main areas: qualitative development—the modernization of existing weapons systems and the appearance of fundamentally new ones; the development of the structure of the armed forces; the expansion of the functions of territorial troops, reserves, and other components of armed forces.

Qualitative Development of Weapons

The main areas of the qualitative development of weapons are the following: the augmentation of the range of weapons; the enhancement of their accuracy; the augmentation of the initial (or boost-phase) speed of projectiles (or missiles); the enhancement of the force of each charge and the appearance and development of multiple charges (warheads and projectiles); the augmentation of the kill area.

Most of these areas of arms development are characteristic of nuclear and conventional weapons.

The problem of increasing the range of missiles and projectiles is still relevant today: The range of air-, sea-, and land-based cruise missiles is still being augmented. The range of missiles determines their class: operational-tactical, medium-range, or strategic.

The enhancement of the accuracy of missiles, warheads, and projectiles is one of the constant functions of weapon designers. Targeting accuracy, which was initially measured in hundreds of meters for missiles, is now measured in dozens of meters; in the case of projectiles and tactical missiles it is measured in a few meters or fractions of a meter.

The augmentation of initial (boost-phase) speed is a relevant issue for missiles and projectiles. The reduction of the boost phase of the missile trajectory (by an increase in speed) is one of the elements of the American program for the improvement of strategic missiles, the appropriations for which have been estimated at around 215 million dollars just in 1987.¹

Increasing the initial speed of projectiles is an extremely important way of enhancing the combat efficiency of cannon artillery and tactical missiles, particularly the surface-to-air class. This increases the range of projectiles and enhances their accuracy and can give surface-to-air missiles antimissile capabilities.

The augmentation of the force of a single weapon and the appearance of multiple warheads (or projectiles) is relevant for all nuclear missile systems and for some types of conventional ammunition. This problem is being solved by modernizing existing ammunition and filling it with explosives and by the development of ammunition of a new type—"excess pressure" or "vacuum" ammunition.

In the case of nuclear missile systems, the problem of augmenting the force of a single weapon has been removed from the agenda, so to speak, by their heightened accuracy and the appearance of cluster warheads. At this time, however, this is more a matter of theory than of practice. The force of the warheads of the modernized Minuteman 3 missile, the new MX, and the Trident 1 and Trident 2 missiles is greater than that of previous models.²

The augmentation of the kill area of separate targets applies primarily to such conventional weapons systems as multiple rocket-launching artillery, cluster aerial ammunition, and aerial cluster mines.

One important question concerns the boundary between the modernization of weapons and the appearance of weapons of a new class. There is no simple answer because there are too many variables here, but when one of the indicators of a weapon's combat properties does not double or triple but increases tenfold or more, this is a weapon of a new class. In some cases a slighter increase can also create a new type of weapon: The absolute amount of the increase is of considerable significance. For example, the transfer from the Trident 1 missile to the Trident 2 meant an increase of approximately 1.5-fold in range, but in absolute terms the transfer from 7,400 km to 11,000 km and the quadrupling or quintupling of accuracy make these missiles comparable in quality to land-based ICBM's³ and put them in a higher class.

New Conventional Weapons Systems

Two factors provided the momentum for further qualitative changes in conventional arms. The first was the air-land battle concept adopted by the U.S. Army in 1982, and the second was its European version, the

"Rogers Plan"—a plan approved by NATO in 1984 for preparations for a deep echeloned strike "against the second echelons and reserves" of the Warsaw Pact countries. These documents not only reflect the current level of improvement in conventional weapons and are based on it, but will also stimulate their further development and signify the beginning of a new qualitative round of the arms race.

At the spring session of the NATO Council in Halifax (Canada, May 1986), defense ministers discussed aspects of the program for the improvement of conventional arms, envisaging the production and purchase of large quantities of new-generation non-nuclear weapons up to 1992. What kind of weapons are these?

Above all, they are conventional weapons with great destructive force. These are fire weapons—projectiles, bombs, missiles, torpedoes, and mines with explosive charges or special compounds which, in combination with the special design of these weapons and their increased range and accuracy, give them more destructive force and make them comparable in many respects to small nuclear devices (of course, without the radiation that is characteristic only of nuclear weapons).

These weapons are combined in the reconnaissance and attack systems corresponding to the new concept of deep air-land operations.

The use of special weapon management systems has secured previously unattainable accuracy. Instead of the hundreds of conventional pieces of ammunition once used to destroy a target, it now takes only one or two guided or homing missiles, bombs like the American Maverick bomb, or projectiles like the Copperhead. More and more new systems combine reconnaissance equipment, automated command and control devices, and means of destruction. These systems are used in a broad range of weapons—from antitank and anti-aircraft complexes to long-range cruise missiles. For example, the AWACS system and the airborne and land-based weapons connected with it can detect targets on land and in the air at a distance of up to 400-600 km, guide aircraft to them and manage their efforts to destroy the targets, transmit data for the use of land-based long-range ammunition, and perform other combat functions.

The destructive force of modern weapons is being increased by adding high-power explosives to ammunition and by making several improvements in design. The "vacuum bomb," using special liquid and gaseous compounds instead of ordinary explosives, has strong destructive force. These compounds spread in aerosol form and create thick explosive mixtures which detonate and form a powerful shock wave that can destroy even concrete structures.

Battlefield targeting area is being augmented dramatically by the use of aviation, rocket-propelled salvo fire systems, and cluster ammunition, including anti-infantry and anti-tank mines. The destruction zone of these weapons is no longer calculated in hectares, but in square kilometers. One new type of ammunition is the special warhead for the Lance missile, containing up to 15 homing devices with ordinary explosive charges and destroying tanks at a distance of up to 120 km. A new phase in the development of this type of weapon, combining high accuracy with the possibility of a formation strike, is the creation of the antiradar complex with a range of up to 500 km⁴ and the work on the Assault Breaker antitank system.

Time-fuse mining in the enemy's rear not only takes enemy materiel and personnel out of the battle but also restricts the movements of second echelons and impedes the advancement of reserves to the battlefield.

The United States also plans to use incendiary weapons in armed conflicts. It is also working on a "magnetic railgun," which will compound the initial speed of the projectile and, consequently, its destructive force.⁵ It will be used primarily as a space weapon, but it can also be used against targets on earth.

All of this ammunition can be used from the same distance as nuclear ammunition with the aid of guns and the tactical and operational- tactical missiles developed in conventional as well as nuclear forms.

Methods of using all types of conventional weapons, based on a combination of highly accurate ammunition for the destruction of single targets and area ammunition for the simultaneous destruction of many, are also being developed. The weapons are different and the principles of their operation differ, but the final goal is still the same: to inflict maximum damages on the enemy. More combinations of ammunition with flat and plunging trajectories are being used—i.e., "frontal attacks" (low-angle fire) are being supplemented by "vertical" destruction, culminating in the destruction of targets from all sides, which severely complicates the defense of troops and the civilian population.

Some of these weapons were used on a fairly broad scale in the Arab- Israeli war of 1973. For the first time in military history losses from guided surface-to-air missiles and guided antitank missiles accounted for the largest number of losses of Israeli aircraft and tanks (50 percent and 70 percent respectively).⁶ Concrete-piercing bombs were used extensively by Israeli aircraft for the destruction of fortified targets, and area bombs were used against unsheltered military personnel; remote-control bombs, guided antiradar shells, and the latest reconnaissance and jamming equipment were also used on a broad scale. In Lebanon in 1982, Israel used the latest American F-15 and F-16 planes and E-2C electronic reconnaissance planes, including unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. The means of radioelectronic

warfare were used on a broad scale and with a new impact, limiting the combat operations of Syrian aviation. Aerial battles began dozens of kilometers before planes actually met, with air-to-air missiles. Missiles of all types and aerial bombs—pellet, cluster, and, for the first time, "vacuum"—and projectiles with a pellet and phosphorus "filling" were used.

The further qualitative development of these weapons is being conducted now. Artillery is the most widely used type of conventional weapon. The further improvement of artillery systems will increase fire range to 40 km,⁷ and in the future the range could be 70 km. Accuracy is also being enhanced.

A new 155-mm Ramrod antitank shell (United States) with an infrared and radar homing device for long-range indirect laying is being produced. It will supplement the Copperhead guided projectile. This is a modernization of something that already exists.

There are also some qualitative changes in artillery, however, which could create new weapons systems. For example, there is the 155-203 caliber cluster antitank projectile (United States). Each projectile contains four subprojectiles with homing devices. They hit tanks from above, where the armor is weakest. The subprojectiles which do not hit the target remain in the ground and become antitank mines.

Antitank mortars are a new type of weapon. As we know, the main purpose of mortars is to eliminate personnel, but now antitank mortar shells are being developed with 1.5-2 times the range of existing antitank weapons. The shell is aimed with the aid of homing devices and hits the tank from above. These shells are already being produced in Great Britain—Merlin, the FRG—Boussard, and Sweden—Stricks.

Equally common aerial ammunition is being improved—controlled bombs of the second and third generations, with 10 or more times the combat effectiveness of ordinary air bombs. They are capable of direct hits in any kind of weather, at minimum altitudes with a free flight range of 40-70 km.⁸

The Stealth technology is being used more widely in the aerospace industry, reducing the radar visibility of modern aircraft and missiles to one-tenth or less and enhancing their ability to penetrate air defense systems.

Air-based cruise missiles have doubled their range, to 4,000 km, and will be supersonic in the future. A sea-based Tomahawk cruise missile with multiple re-entry vehicles and independently targetable warheads has been tested. This is indisputably a new type of weapon.

Hypersonic aircraft with a flight speed five or six times the speed of sound and spacecraft capable of even higher speeds are being designed.

Even strategic carriers are being adapted for the use of conventional ammunition, including the B-1B bomber. This bomber can carry from 38 to 128 highly accurate controlled bombs or from 86 to 101 conventional cluster bombs,⁹ which will kill all forms of life in an area of 10-12 square kilometers.

The U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative" is creating opportunities for the development of new weapons systems. This means that the latest achievements of science and technology will be used not only in space weapons systems but also in the entire range of armaments. The automation and computerization of command and control systems and the incorporation of robot technology will lead to the appearance of not only unmanned aircraft but also ground equipment—tanks, self-propelled guns, and other unmanned combat equipment.

The development of conventional weapons has radically changed ideas about the modern "battlefield." According to the London International Institute of Strategic Studies, qualitative changes have already augmented all combat indicators dramatically. For example, the range of artillery and mortars—the most widely used weapons—has doubled: from 15 to 30 km or more. The range of tactical aviation (fighter planes and attack aircraft) has at least quintupled: from 50 to 250-300 km. The range of fighter-bombers has reached 500 km or more; tactical and operational-tactical missiles of the surface-to-surface class destroy targets at a range of 500-1,000 km, and medium-range missiles destroy targets at a distance of 2,000-2,500 km. As a result, the depth of the modern "battlefield" is at least 10 times as great as it was in World War II.¹⁰ This indicator reflects the range of the impact of all weapons on military formations, beginning with firearms—i.e., from hundreds of meters to 500 km.

The new conventional weapons systems, including those with more destructive force, are being developed and produced primarily in the United States and other leading NATO countries—the FRG, France, and Great Britain—as well as in Israel, South Africa, and Japan. These systems are radically enhancing the combat strength of modern conventional arms and are allowing relatively small armed forces to possess great destructive power and the ability to carry out large-scale strategic operations. The armed forces of Japan are one example of this.

These types of weapons are called conventional arms and supposedly do not create the risk of nuclear escalation. Their development is viewed as an alternative to nuclear arms reduction in the NATO countries. Besides this, they do not encounter as much opposition from peaceful forces as nuclear weapons.

According to reports in the Western press the "Rogers Plan" envisages strikes deep within the territory of the Warsaw Pact countries with the use of the latest conventional arms, particularly highly accurate combat equipment, powerful homing missiles, and electronic means of

warfare. Although the "Rogers Plan" does not officially envisage the use of nuclear ammunition, the 200 or so nuclear reactors in Europe represent a real threat of nuclear catastrophe even without the use of nuclear means of warfare. The possibility of the use of long-range cruise missiles in conventional combat equipment is also dangerous, especially since it is virtually impossible to distinguish them from nuclear missiles.

Therefore, the current quantitative growth and qualitative modification of conventional arms in the 1980's have taken them out of the "conventional" framework and are establishing the necessary conditions for the quick conduct of major strategic operations with their aid.

The use of these weapons is not as likely to "raise the nuclear threshold," as Westerners have declared, as to create the danger of the escalation of any conflict to the point of nuclear war. Some Western military theorists believe that in the event of a conflict in Central Europe, it will be too late to request permission to use nuclear weapons when an enemy invasion is anticipated.

Development of Structure and Increase in Number of Armed Forces of United States and other NATO Members

The need to enhance the strategic mobility of armed forces and the ability to quickly transfer units and companies to overseas military theaters or from one theater to another for the reinforcement of existing troop formations or the creation of new ones has recently been a matter of special concern in the United States. Strategic mobility is secured by the high combat readiness of the tactical aviation, Marine, and infantry units and companies scheduled for transfer, the readiness of air and naval transport forces and vehicles to move troops and payloads, the presence of supplies of weapons and materiel for transferred troops in the most important theaters of military operations and on floating depots, and other conditions.

At the beginning of the 1980's the American administration officially declared many parts of the world zones of "vital U.S. interests." This imperious claims call for the appropriate military logistical support. What is its current status?

We will list a few of the elements contributing to the quicker augmentation of existing groupings of U.S. armed forces and the creation of new ones in various theaters of military operations.

First of all, there are the American military bases overseas. There are 373 main bases in 22 countries. Besides this, more than 30 national bases, airports, and ports are being leased in 8 countries for periodic use by U.S. armed forces.¹¹ In all, more than 500,000 American servicemen are stationed here in peacetime. The military bases of the United States represent not only a specific

contingent of armed troops, but also the existence of reserves and material and technical supplies allowing for the rapid transfer and arming of additional forces.

Supplies of U.S. materiel on military bases in Western Europe, for example, allow for the rapid (within around 10 to 14 days) deployment of six additional divisions with support units, numbering up to 400,000 personnel, and the tripling of the total number of tactical aircraft (to over 2,000).¹²

Second, there are the mobile formations of U.S. armed forces, especially the "rapid deployment forces." Created in 1980, they now number around 400,000 personnel, including four or five (six in the future) highly mobile infantry divisions, a few separate brigades, special-purpose and support units, over 700 tactical aircraft, several dozen strategic aircraft, three carrier task forces, and other forces.¹³

In 1983 the Central Command of the U.S. Armed Forces, CENTCOM, was created to command this grouping. Its sphere of responsibility includes the territory of 19 states in Southwest Asia and Northeast Africa and part of the Indian Ocean, including the Persian Gulf and Red Sea.

The third method of augmenting the strategic mobility of U.S. armed forces consists in enhancing the mobility of all general-purpose forces, especially the infantry, because aviation and naval forces are this mobile by their very nature.

This line is being implemented vigorously within the framework of the "Army-90" program. The purpose of this program is to enhance the strategic and tactical mobility and combat capabilities of U.S. troops and prepare them for protracted military operations in all possible theaters of war. The program is secured by deliveries of the latest combat equipment for the infantry. It began with the reorganization of mechanized and armored divisions, or "heavy" divisions.

Highly maneuverable light infantry divisions numbering around 11,000 personnel each are being created (five are to be created by 1989). The organization and arming of these divisions presuppose not only heightened mobility on the battlefield—tactical—but also readiness for rapid transfer to overseas theaters of military operations. These will require less than half of the aircraft needed by existing divisions.

All of these areas of military organization in the U.S. Armed Forces combined correspond to the military concept of geographic or horizontal escalation. They reflect the stronger emphasis on the training of U.S. armed forces to fight wars with conventional weapons.

The enhancement of the strategic mobility of armed forces is also arousing considerable attention in Great Britain and France, which also have rapid deployment

components in their armed forces. At the time of the Falkland conflict, Great Britain demonstrated the mobility of its armed forces, and France has transferred its troops several times to African countries and to its island territories. The contingent of French rapid deployment forces numbers around 50,000 personnel. Both of these countries have military bases in different parts of the world and are prepared to create additional large contingents of mobile troops when necessary.

The quantitative growth of NATO armed forces is still going on, despite the seeming external stability of their numbers. For example, there are 2,178,000 people in the regular armed forces of the United States, and the respective figures for other countries are 557,000 for France, 485,000 for the FRG, 387,000 for Italy, around 330,000 for Great Britain, and over 650,000 for Turkey.¹⁴ The total armed forces of the European NATO countries number more than 3.3 million, and the addition of the U.S. contingent in Europe brings the figure up to 3.68 million.

The number of personnel in the regular armed forces of the United States rose from 2.05 million in 1980 to 2.178 million at the end of 1986. The use of new combat equipment in the Navy, Air Force, and Army could result in another increase of 100,000-250,000. Most of the increase in the number of regular armed forces personnel and in their combat readiness, however, is the result of the more active use of reserve forces. In the United States there are around 1,124,000 people in the reserves and the National Guard. Several National Guard formations of up to division size have taken part in the comprehensive "Autumn Forge" exercises in recent years and have been transported to Europe (the "Reforger" exercises). Therefore, the armed forces are undergoing both quantitative and qualitative growth. In the United States the total number of armed forces personnel has now reached 3,302,000.¹⁵

Similar processes are taking place in other NATO countries.

France and Great Britain have around 80,000 territorial troops each; these countries are also building up their mobile strategic forces and arms. The territorial defense troops in Italy number more than 35,000, and there are over 90,000 military police (carabinieri).

The development and intensification of the activities of the territorial troops of all NATO countries have recently been assigned priority; the total number in the bloc's five leading countries alone is over 1.4 million.

In addition, the high number of civilian personnel in the armed forces of the NATO countries should be taken into account: 30 percent of the regular armed forces in the FRG and 50 percent in the United States. As a rule, these people perform the kind of functions that are performed exclusively by servicemen in other armies, including the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries.

In the NATO countries this is explained by the nature of possible future wars, in which the boundary between the front and the rear will be erased; active operations by the other side are supposedly possible deep within the rear of any Western country, and this would demand the appropriate countermeasures. Territorial troops, which differ little in their structure and arms from regular troops, will perform their functions in the national interest and in the interest of the NATO command, particularly the function of guarding and defending the supply lines of the north and central army groups in the Central European military theater.

There has recently been a clear tendency toward a stronger connection between the issues of nuclear and conventional arms reductions and an acknowledgement of the need to find new approaches and make major breakthroughs in the reduction of conventional arms and armed forces.

This matter was discussed in fundamental terms in the 15 January 1986 statement by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev. It stressed the need for "negotiated reductions in conventional arms and armed forces...in addition to the removal of weapons of mass destruction from state arsenals."¹⁶

In his speech in Berlin in April 1986, M.S. Gorbachev advanced the idea of the reduction of conventional arms and armed forces throughout Europe—from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The appeal by the Warsaw Pact states to the NATO states and all European countries, "containing a program for the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe," adopted at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Budapest in June 1986, set forth a detailed program for the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe. Working groups of experts from the Warsaw Pact states met in November 1986 and January 1987 to discuss this matter, and there have been unofficial consultations between Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. The socialist countries believe that even minimal reductions in USSR and U.S. troops in Central Europe (of 16,000-18,000 personnel combined) will be important from the political standpoint as an indication that the sides will be willing to agree to more substantial reductions, accompanied by new forms of verification.

After the NATO Council session in Halifax, a "high-level group" began formulating the North Atlantic alliance's position on conventional arms. To date, however, there has been no real response to the socialist countries' appeal. Furthermore, the need to make every effort to fulfill the obligation to modernize conventional forces was discussed at the NATO Council session in Brussels (December 1986). This need was then reaffirmed at a meeting of NATO's European group in May 1987. The declaration on "conventional arms control" adopted at the Brussels session of the NATO Council does not even

mention the proposals in the Budapest appeal. It does, however, mention the need to establish a stable balance of conventional forces in Europe while retaining effective means of deterrence, including nuclear and conventional forces. The willingness to "work out a new mandate for conventional arms control talks" is expressed in this context. We should note that this is not a mandate on the reduction of armed forces and arms, but only on control. The mandate for the upcoming talks is now being discussed in unofficial meetings of representatives of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries.

The final document of the Stockholm conference, approved in September 1986, formulated important principles regarding confidence-building measures and security, covering most general-purpose forces and conventional arms, and this paved the way for the second stage of the conference. The elaboration of the mandate for the second stage, which should focus, in the opinion of the socialist countries, on the reduction of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe and on the extension of confidence-building measures to the naval activities of states, will depend largely on the outcome of the Vienna meeting of the states party to the all-Europe process.

The new UN conference on the prohibition or limitation of the use of specific types of conventional weapons could play an important role in developing and supplementing the existing convention on this issue.¹⁷ At this time, the limitations do not extend to such forms of conventional weapons as detonating flammable mixtures (the contents of "vacuum" ammunition), several types of incendiary weapons (particularly napalm), some types of small weapons (needle-shaped devices), and others. New protocols to supplement the three existing ones could substantially reduce opportunities for the use of these inhumane types of weapons in combat.

The document "On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact States" introduces considerable clarity and detail into this matter.¹⁸ One of the goals declared in the document is of fundamental importance: "The reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe to a level at which neither side, while securing its defense, will have the means of a sudden attack on the other side or the means to launch offensive operations in general." This will require the mutual withdrawal of the most dangerous offensive weapons from the zone where the two military alliances come into direct contact with one another, and the reduction of the concentration of armed forces and arms here to an agreed minimum. In essence, this will mean the creation of non-offensive defense in Europe on a mutual basis. Many of the theories of individuals and groups, which have been making the rounds of progressive circles in the West for several years now, on the creation of so-called "non-provocative defense" are now embodied in the Warsaw Pact document.

Footnotes

1. PRAVDA, 28 December 1985.
2. "The Military Balance, 1985-1986," London, 1985, p 158.
3. Ibid.
4. The antiradar complex consists of up to 10 TR-1 reconnaissance and command planes, F-4, F-16, and F-15 fighter planes, controlled bombs, missiles, and other weapons. In the future the number of destroyed targets could rise to 50 or more.
5. "Gonka vooruzheniy" [Arms Race], edited by A.D. Nikonov, Moscow, 1986, p 186.
6. Ibid., p 183.
7. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 march 1987. An Austrian concern, Fest-Alpine, has produced more than 500 of these weapons.
8. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 June 1986.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 21 February 1986.
11. "Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru" [The Origins of the Threat to Peace], 4th ed., Moscow, 1987, pp 33, 34-35.
12. Ibid., pp 22, 29, 61.
13. Ibid., p 32.
14. "The Military Balance, 1986-1987," pp 57-78; "Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru," pp 22-23.
15. Ibid.
16. PRAVDA, 16 January 1986.
17. The convention on the prohibition or limitation of the use of specific types of conventional weapons capable of causing excessive damage or having non-selective effects and the three protocols to it were drafted in Geneva at a UN conference attended by representatives of around 80 states in 1979 and 1980. It was approved by the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly on 12 December 1980 and went into effect on 2 December 1983. It is open-ended. There are 24 states party to the convention, including the USSR.
18. PRAVDA, 30 May 1987.

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